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ABSTRACT 
Over the past ten years, the demand for UN Information Operations (IO) has grown, with 
the UN initiating or strengthening seventeen peacekeeping operations and increasing the 
number of deployed UN personnel. Given the growing demand for UN peacekeeping, we 
will examine, assess, and make recommendations for increasing UN Information 
operations during peacekeeping (IODP) effectiveness. This thesis will focus on UN 
information operations from a tactical methodology of peacekeeping operations utilizing 
the information hierarchy of needs in a post conflict situation. To determine whether the 
United Nations has established IODP, the following questions are addressed: 
What is more important: the IO message or the information system (IS)? Is a 
successful system sufficient for IO success? What is the information hierarchy? What 
impact does the information hierarchy have on peacekeeping operations? Who should 
deliver the message? How should the message be delivered? What is the structure for 
evaluating UN IODP? When, where, and how has the UN succeeded in utilizing IODP in 
missions? Where has it failed and what were the IO issues it faced? How can the United 
Nations and member countries better utilize information operations? How can the United 
Nations utilize the information hierarchy to garner public support in post-conflict 
environments? How can the United Nations counter competing information? How do you 
manage expectations in a post conflict situation? Are the tools used by the United Nations 
for managing expectations during peacekeeping operations effective? 
Specifically, in this thesis, we examine:(1) the evolution of UN IODP over the 
past decade; (2) the characteristics of ongoing IODP in case studies from Kosovo, 
Liberia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia; (3) the current structure for evaluating the UN IODP  and 
the challenges, if any, the current structure poses, specifically in the previously 
mentioned case; and (4) countering disinformation efforts  in IODP case studies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The literature on the United Nation’s (UN) usage of information operations is 
diverse. Some argue that the UN’s information operations program is functioning 
successfully while others believe there are issues and challenges within the organization 
regarding its approach to IO. Moreover, there is little analytical research on new 
generation peacekeeping which is more media savvy, aiming first at the host nations, and 
finally involving a two-way interactive approach towards the local people. In this thesis, 
to determine whether the United Nations has established effective Information Operations 
during Peacekeeping (IODP), the following questions will be addressed: 
What are the UN IODP capabilities? What impact do information systems have 
on peacekeeping operations?  When, where, and how has the UN succeeded in utilizing 
IODP? Where has it failed and what were the Information Operations (IO) issues it 
faced? How can the United Nations and member countries better utilize information 
systems? Does the UN have appropriate doctrines, policies, and strategies for information 
operations?   
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The peacekeeping concept requires a better understanding of the use of the media 
for peaceful goals. This thesis intends to offer an empirical understanding of 
peacekeeping information operations based on case studies. This thesis will analyze how 
the United Nations Public Information Office utilized media tools in peacekeeping 
missions in Kosovo, Liberia, and Ethiopia to influence the population within the host 
nations and ensure the population supported United Nations peace goals. Additionally, 






campaigns. This research will analyze the outcomes of Public Information (PI) 
campaigns and other information operations, utilizing Maslow’s information hierarchy 
model.1 
C. BACKGROUND 
Often the terms “Information Operations” (IO) or “Information Campaigns” (IC) 
are associated with the use of military information support operations, deception, public 
affairs, and electronic warfare; where information is used as a tool in national power
2
 
However, according to the UN public information office, information operations might 
also be employed for peace, stability, and development.
3
 Indeed, the UN has been using 
information for peace and humanitarian goals since 1946 when the UN Department of 
Public Information (DPI) was founded. During peacekeeping operations, the UN utilizes 
information operations, but refrains from calling these procedures as such; it 
euphemistically calls them “Public Information Campaigns (PI)” or “Sensitization 
Programs.”  These campaigns include, but are not limited to, online training programs, 
public awareness campaigns (e.g. mine awareness, election programs), public 
information campaigns about the peacekeeping activities and accomplishments, and 
counter-operations to negate malicious rumors. 
This thesis will focus on examining how information operations can shape 
peoples’ attitudes and influence the population to support UN peacekeeping goals. 
Additionally this thesis will focus on how the UN IODP utilized the media and 
communication tools for peaceful aims. Information operations, by definition, cover all 
kind of activities that use information through media and communication tools in order to 
                                                 
1“Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Diagrams of Maslow’s Motivational Theory - Pyramid 
Diagrams of Maslow’s Theory “ http://www.businessballs.com/maslow.htm (accessed 8/22/2012). 
2 In military domains, IO is generally defined as an operation in which the information is used as a tool 
in national power. As it is displayed on the NDU webpage, it is “Information content and technology used 
as a strategic instrument to shape fundamental political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-
term basis to affect the global behavior of governments, supra- and non-governmental organizations, and 
societies to support national security strategies & objectives.” For more information see “Programs, 
Courses, & Services “ at http://www.ndu.edu/icollege/pcs/pcs_iscp.html (accessed 2/26/2012) and 
http://www.ndu.edu/icollege/pcs/pcs_iscp.html. 
3Charles Fromm et al, “GAID White Paper on ICT4D Health “ 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/35120854/GAID-White-Paper-on-ICT4D-Health (accessed 3/1/2012). 
 2 
influence the behavior of a targeted group towards particular subjects. Since the UN aims 
to affect the peoples’ attitude towards peace, negotiations, and development, we will use 
the term “Information Operations during Peacekeeping” (IODP) in order to explain the 
strategy used by the UN to affect the behavior and attitudes of the host nations during 
peace operations. Indeed, when running a PI campaign the UN is not just delivering 
information but also expecting a positive societal outcome so that people will know more 
about the UN and its activities, encouraging them to promote and support peacekeeping 
operations within the host country.  By the same token, throughout the thesis the terms PI 
and IODP will be used interchangeably.  
In the wake of the Cold War, the collapse of the  Soviet Union led to instability 
and internal conflicts in several countries. The end of the Cold War enabled cooperation 
and laid the groundwork for the development of UN peacekeeping operations to address 
the internal conflicts within these countries.
4
 Since the early 1990s, the UN has been 
conducting missions in these countries.  
Meanwhile, rapid technological innovations have led to substantial improvements 
in almost every aspect of life, including information systems. Availability of the Internet, 
social networking, crowd sourcing, and cell phones facilitated the access to information 
in a timeless manner. These new developments provided more opportunities for the UN 
and other humanitarian organizations to employ information tools for the goals of the 
peacekeeping operations.  There are also challenges that the UN needs to overcome.  
Some of the challenges the UN faces when intervening in these countries include: a lack 
of technology, an underdeveloped infrastructure, illiteracy, and poverty. Additionally, 
some of these countries have their own national agenda, or maintain a negative approach 
towards outside national or vocational groups. 
Various arguments have been presented in order to explain the effectiveness of 
IODP. Some theorists argue that the United Nations has a strong information operations 
doctrine and practice, while others present strong criticisms of how the UN has an 
                                                 
4Lynn E. Davis, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking After the Cold War 
RAND Corporation, [1993, Santa Monica, California]). 
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inadequate doctrine and ineffective tools to implement successful IODP. By exploring 
both sides of the argument, this thesis aims to examine the weaknesses and strengths of 
the UN IODP.   
D. THESIS SCOPE 
The UN’s new generation IODP and particularly PI campaigns target and affect 
the host nations in post-conflict countries, international media, as well as people and 
decision making mechanisms of these contributing countries. However this thesis does 
not intend to study the effects of the IODP on the international media or the contributing 
countries but rather confines itself to the effect on the host nations. The UN claims to use 
information tools only to inform and communicate with the local populations; however, 
this thesis asserts the UN utilizes IO and media tools to rouse a positive reaction from the 
population towards the UN goals in peace operations.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to understand the shortcomings—if any—of UN information operations, 
this thesis will examine case studies about UN Information Operations during 
peacekeeping operations (IODP) in Kosovo, Liberia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia, and will make 
recommendations for increasing their effectiveness in influencing the host population 
within these countries. 
The United Nations’ information doctrine and practices are available through 
official UN documents as well as open source materials. Case studies are used to 
compare and contrast successful and unsuccessful examples of the UN IODP in order to 
understand strategies and to determine effective lessons and best practices. The thesis 
ends with recommendations on what should be done to improve United Nations 
information operation capabilities. 
To illustrate the people’s need for information in the post-conflict countries, the 
thesis applies Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs model to the IODP. Often ignored 
and neglected by peace researchers, the Hierarchy of Human Needs Theory may offer 
valuable insights into the sources of conflict and thus possible resolutions. Basically all 
 4 
human beings want recognition and respect. The authors attempt to make a connection to 
link this simple example to the inner mechanisms of humanitarian organizations and 
illustrate how Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs can be used for political gain and influence 
within a population.   
Overall, this thesis will incorporate and focus on strategic communications during 
peacekeeping (the message), open source intelligence during peacekeeping (the reality), 
and joint information operations and electronic communications (the technology). 
Chapter II reviews the literature on how Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory can be 
applied to the need for information in post-conflict zones, and also comprises a general 
overview of the UN’s usage of media tools in order to disseminate its messages in post-
conflict zones and affect the behaviors of the population towards peace and 
reconciliation. Main terms are also defined in Chapter II.  Chapter III discusses the 
challenges of IODP in peacekeeping countries, the innovations and evolution of the 
concept, and the role of the media. Chapter IV comprises case studies in which the UN 
IODP in Kosovo, Liberia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia, as well as the media and socio-historical 
context are evaluated and examined. Chapter V compares and contrasts these cases and 
analyzes the successes and failures of these campaigns.  Additionally, Chapter V 
examines how the UN can increase the effectiveness of its peacekeeping activities by 
better implementing IODP.  Lessons learned and recommendations are also drawn in this 
chapter for future cases.  
 5 
II. INFORMATION HIERARCHY AND INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS DURING PEACEKEEPING 
A. WHAT IS THE MASLOW HIERARCHY? 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs Theory may offer valuable insights into the 
sources of conflict, and thus possible resolutions. This chapter looks at how Human 
Needs Theory can be applied to UN Information Operations during Peacekeeping (IODP) 
in Kosovo, Liberia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia. These countries are called post-conflict 
countries, which assume that the fight is over; however, it does not necessarily mean that 
the conflict is totally terminated. It is true that in the post-conflict environment violent is 
not as tense as it was during the conflict times, but there are still some remaining ill-
sentiments that obstruct peace. In these zones, however, the conflicting parties are 
generally tired of skirmishes resulting in them being more prone to peace than they are to 
fight.  As Dan Lindley puts it where peace and war hang in the balance—or the peace 
surpasses the conflict—there is more need for information operations, and these 
operations are likely to prosper.
5
 If this need is addressed strategically, the behaviors and 
attitudes of the involved groups in the host nation can be improved significantly. 
Basically, all human beings want recognition and respect; the withdrawal or 
denial of recognition and respect, experienced as humiliation, is the strongest force that 
creates rifts between people and breaks down relationships.6 Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Needs provides an example of inherited behaviors influencing played strategies. The 
Hierarchy of Needs “is a construct, derived from the theory of human motivation,” 
advanced by Abraham H. Maslow during the mid-twentieth century, and essentially says 
all individuals pursue a hierarchy of needs that in large measure is based on self-interest, 
thus accounting for their behavior. What was found of interest was a connection that 
                                                 
5Dan Lindley, “Untapped Power? the Status of UN Information Operations,” International 
Peacekeeping 11, no. 4 (2004): 15. 
6Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Diagrams of Maslow’s Motivational Theory - Pyramid 
Diagrams of Maslow’s Theory.  
 6 
attempted to link this simple example to the inner workings of organizations that use 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs for political gain and influence within a population.  
A direct connection between influence within a population and the social and 
physical needs of that population can be seen in Maslow’s analysis of behavioral strategy. 
According to Maslow, human beings have physiological, psychological, and sociological 
needs such as food, clothes, safety, belongingness, love, esteem, and self-actualization 




• Variation: People choose and use dissimilar strategies by accident, by design, 
or via trial and error. 
• Selection: Environment (in this case, other players) will reward some 
strategies with higher payoffs. 
• Reproduction: Strategies are “reproduced” via social transmission, imitation, 
learning, et cetera. 
His work showed that though societies provide what appears to be the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number; this state may not be evolutionary stable. A society of 
this form can be considered to be made up of altruistic doves. As long as only doves are 
added to the society nobody will fight with anybody else. However such a society will be 
upset by the introduction of a hawk that comes in and takes the unit of “food” without 
opposition. The hawks then will thrive and multiply until there are so many that hawks 
begin to clash with each other. This clashing will keep the hawk population in check. 
If one takes an organization that engages in ethnic conflict to be the hawks and 
the rest of the normal population to be doves, a situation will undoubtedly result in an 
increase in recruiting and ethnic conflict until there are too many of them, and they begin 
to clash against each other. A more likely result is that another “type” of hawk is added 
into the society. This second type of hawk is known as “Law Enforcement Services,” “the 
 
 
                                                 
7C. George Boeree, “Abraham Maslow,” Personality Theories (May 2006),  
http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/maslow.html. 
 7 
State”, or “the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.” In order to address the need for 
information among the conflicting hawks and dove population, the UN peacekeepers 
need to use IODP. 
B. STRUCTURE EMPLOYED TO EVALUATE THE INFORMATION 
HIERARCHY 
As the second type of hawk, the UN Peacekeeping Forces should resolve the 
problems that are introduced by the first type of hawks. These solutions include healing 
the wounds inflicted by the first hawks by providing aid distribution; protecting the doves 
from the hawks (peacekeeping and supporting law enforcement); preventing the hawks 
from inflicting more pain on doves, in other words, enacting Demobilization, 
Disarmament, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRR); and finishing the skirmishes 
between hawk gangs (negotiations). By making all of these attempts known to the 
community of doves, these second hawks will improve the doves’ behavior and gain their 
support through peace (IODP).  
Information operations can help the UN connect with the motivations and needs 
of the local population, which in turn enables PI officers to organize, coordinate and 
execute widely disbursed operations. This section explores the importance of the host 
population in the UN IODP, and the relevance of the Hierarchy of Needs in PI 
campaigns. There is great value in understanding how the one constant in information 
operations—human nature—and its hierarchy of needs fit into PI campaigns and how IO 
campaigns therefore can and should be built around the Hierarchy of Needs. Maslow’s 
work, directed toward understanding the human psyche, provides valuable insight into 
human nature. It is this insight that is applicable to the development and implantation of 
effective information operations during peacekeeping. 
Maslow’s hierarchy, illustrated in Figure 1, is divided into five basic areas of 
essential needs.8The five basic needs that Maslow addresses include the top needs: self-
actualization, esteem, love and belonging, safety, and the bottom physiological 
(breathing, food, water) needs.  
                                                 
8Howard, An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding, 14. 
 8 
As has been demonstrated throughout history, relationship-building is based on 
this Hierarchy of Needs. Information operations which address the Hierarchy of Needs 
have been powerful force multipliers, often directly contributing to success. A better 
understanding of the Hierarchy of Needs will lead to new tactics and methods to enable 
the UN IODP to favorably influence the will of the civilian population to support their 
activities and undermine spoilers and those spoilers’ disinformation within the local 
population. The Hierarchy gives the UN IODP an inside look on human motivations and 
explains (to a point) why influence can be such a compelling factor in the implementation 
of IODP and Public Information campaigns. Perhaps the most important conclusion is 
what critical information requirements have to do with understanding the attitudes, 
beliefs, and mood of the local civilian population. Understanding the nature of the 
technical information and the infrastructure of communications, studying the messages 
being put out by the local and international media, and assessing the combination of 
spoilers and disinformation are all helpful, but they cannot substitute for a good 
understanding of the hierarchy of needs and the pulse of the local populace. Therefore, 
IODP activities must be aligned based on humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected 
local people.9 
                                                 
9Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Diagrams of Maslow’s Motivational Theory – Pyramid 
Diagrams of Maslow’s Theory.  
 9 














Figure 1.   Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs Model. 
Before answering the questions of whether the UN has favorable policies, 
doctrines, and strategies, one must first examine how information operations can be 
defined. Although the UN does not have a specific definition for their information 
operations and campaigns, official UN sites give enough evidence concerning the 
organization’s approach towards IO. Due to the bad connotations of IO components, such 






























euphemistically calls them Public Information campaigns or Sensitization Activities; 
however, this thesis asserts that the UN’s activities can be recognized as IO, due to the 
fact that these activities aim at a behavioral and attitudinal change in the targeted 
populations, albeit for peaceful purposes. Therefore this thesis entitles all UN activities 
using media and communication tools in order to increase awareness and improve the 
attitude of the people towards peacekeeping activities as Information Operations during 
Peacekeeping (IODP). The goal of peacebuilding, in general, is a change in the 
community from conflict and hatred to peace and tranquility. IODP can make this 
transition quicker, smoother, and more effective.10Figure 2 illustrates how media and 
other communications tools can be used for a behavioral change within the society.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Expected Societal Change as an Outcome of the UN IODP (From Bratic 
and Scrich 2012) 
Using the terms outlined on the United Nations’ public information website, a 
simple definition of IODP can be understood as UN processes that are being utilized to 
disseminate global messages to local audiences and to promote global awareness and 




                                                 
10Viladimir Bratic and Lisa Scrich, “Why and when to use the Media for Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding,” http://www.gppac.net/uploads/File/Programmes/Awareness Raising/Issue paper Media and 
Conflict Prevention - final version.pdf (accessed 5/27/2012). 
 11 
order to achieve these goals, the UN utilizes various communication tools including 
radio, television, newspapers, the Internet, videoconferencing, and increasingly other new 
information technology.11 
Technology is a significant component in modern peacekeeping information 
activities. Technological innovations make access to the information easy and fast. For 
this reason, Armistead emphasizes technology when discussing his views on IO and 
describes IODP as the “use of modern technology to deliver critical information and 
influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control 
behavior in an environment in which time zones are as important as national 
boundaries.”12 However, in some cases socio-economic and infrastructural shortcomings 
of the post-conflict zones pose challenges to new technology and innovation. For 
example, in order to reach people who do not have access to a computer or who cannot 
read, the peacekeepers often have to rely on pre-Internet technology that includes the 
radio or face-to-face interaction. 
The term Public Information (PI) campaigns can be used interchangeably with 
IODP. Ross Howard describes the PI as “a proactive media based intervention.”13 A 
peacekeeping force uses the media to counter disinformation, take actions to provide 
immediate information about peacekeeping activities, and to program intended outcomes 
such as transforming attitudes positively, promoting reconciliation, and reducing conflict. 
Public Information campaigns are a component of IODP and as such are defined as media 
campaigns that provide real-world information to the targeted population. In these media 
campaigns, the UN disseminates positive information in line with anticipated goals and 
counters disinformation that has been disseminated by spoilers.  
                                                 
11“United Nations Information Centres” 
http://unic.un.org/aroundworld/unics/en/whoWeAre/aboutDPI/index.asp (accessed 3/1/2012). 
12Leigh Armistead, Information Operations : Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power / Edited by 
Leigh Armistead, 1st ed. (Dulles, Va. : Brassey’s: Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.) United States. National 
Security Agency/Central Security Service, 2004). 
13Howard, “An OperationalFramework,” 10–11. Ross Howard classifies media based interventions 
into five categories and proactive media based intervention is the fourth category in this typology. 
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The term IO is also used interchangeably with information campaigns conducted 
by humanitarian and civilian actors. According to Avruch et al., the peaceful usage of IO 
relates to the terms of public relations, press relations and advertising, problem solving, 
diplomacy, and perception management over contesting parties. 14 
C. STABILIZATION AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Peace building can be defined as the international efforts to identify and support 
the structures that will strengthen the peace and prevent relapse of the conflict in a post-
conflict country followed by peacekeeping efforts that aim to stabilize the country and 
heal the wounds of war or internal conflict.15According to the UN, peacekeeping is 
supposed to be a temporary measure and thus should be accompanied or followed by 
peace-making activities which will peacefully settle the conflict.16 According to Howard, 
these efforts should be intensified in order to establish a lasting peace and resolve the 
discrepancies within that post-conflict society. As the term “post-conflict” denotes, in 
these societies, conflict is somehow ceased and combating parties agreed in some way to 
end the conflict. Local actors may act willingly towards peacekeeping and reconstruction, 
yet they typically lack the means and power to do so. The bad memories of the conflict 
and bias toward each other also undermine the impartiality of any indigenous actors. 
Therefore the need for external aid from the UN and other impartial third parties is 
inescapable. 
The UN and other peacekeeping institutions generally run missions in post-
conflict countries. These missions depend on Security Council resolutions and 
comprehensive peace agreements with the state and conflicting parties. The agreement 
generally describes the duties of the mission as well as its mandate, responsibilities, and 
power. The use of media and IODP are also defined in the agreement. Sometimes a lack 
of democratic culture can show itself in the shape of fear from criticism in the media thus 
                                                 
 14K. Avruch, J. L. Narel and P. & Combelles-Siegel, “Information Campaigns for Peace 
Operations,” 2007, http://search.proquest.com/docview/23976399?accountid=12702. 
15Davis, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking After the Cold War, 32. 
16United Nations, the Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, second edition (New 
York: United nations Publication DPI, 1990), 5. 
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leading to resistance from the state toward peacekeeping media activities in the 
territories. However, the importance of IODP allows the UN to convince the local 
government to yield some of its sovereignty over the media thereby operating in favor of 
both UN media operations and local media freedom.  
Peace building efforts generally start with confidence building activities such as 
providing security, imposing and observing ceasefire arrangements, assisting troop 
withdrawals, providing buffer zones between conflicting groups, and delivering 
humanitarian aid.17 The first international actors in the field are therefore non-
governmental organizations (NGO), the UN military, and the UN police. After reaching 
certain success in these first tasks of confidence building, the peacekeepers turn their 
efforts to facilitating building and instituting activities for developing and reconstruction.  
IODP accompanies all of the abovementioned peacekeeping activities. UN 
Information Operations campaigns utilize the media to ensure they report on activities 
that represent the United Nations and its peacekeeping efforts in a positive light. This 
fosters assurance and optimism within the population as well as establishes the 
groundwork for local collaboration with the population in future endeavors. The media is 
also essential for peacekeepers to let people know where to find aid materials, when 
programs will happen, and how they will be accomplished. Therefore, the use of media 
and particularly IODP is an important element in peacekeeping.  
D. IMPORTANCE FOR IODP AND PI FOR PEACEKEEPING 
In all United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, an effective communications 
strategy that includes good relations with both local and international media is a political 
and operational necessity. A peacekeeping operation may enjoy initial worldwide 
support, but without an effective and consistent public information program, support can 
quickly turn to apathy and even opposition. Peacekeeping operations require the 
understanding, cooperation, and support of all players—local and external—to fulfill 
their mandates. These include the parties to the conflict, the local population, and the 
                                                 
17United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 5. 
 14 
international community whose political and material support is fundamental to the 
success of a peacekeeping mission.18 
Martti Ahtisaari, a Nobel Peace Laureate and former Special Representative to the 
Secretary General of the UN for Kosovo, believes that information and communication 
systems—with good management of information operations and information sharing—
can help the humanitarian community solve the crisis and save lives.19 He points out that 
the information systems have already proved they have potential to reduce loss of life; 
provide decision makers with timely crucial information; enable evaluation of feedback 
from recipients of the aid material; create institutional memory, which is critical given the 
fact that the humanitarian staff woks in rotation; provide early warning signals of conflict 
and threats; and improve the security of humanitarian personnel.   
One of the noteworthy peacekeeping experts in the field, Ambassador Robert B. 
Oakley, the U.S. President’s special envoy to Somalia during UNOSOM and UNOSOM 
II realized that PI was essential in public relations and media relations.20 According to 
Oakley, if a humanitarian organization is defeated by their enemy in public information, 
they will fail to convey their message to the mass population, and therefore, their link to 
the public will be broken. This can be more damaging in a case where the other party has 
a strong IO capability, particularly a good disinformation campaign. It is at this point that 
the “rubber often meets the road,” and the UN can start to lose the popular support of the 
host nation.21Only with the correct usage of IO tools can the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
18United Nations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/library/Handbook on UN PKOs.pdf ed. (New York, 
NY: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations, December 
2003). 
19Daniel Stauffacher et al, ICT for Peace Foundation » Peacebuilding in the Information Age: Sifting 
Hype from Reality (Switzerland: The Berknman Center for Internet and Society at Harward University, 
January, 2011). 
20Osman Mentes and Rob Hagerty, How to Stabilize Failing States: The Good the Bad and the Ugly of 
International Intervention(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), PG#. Peacemaking and 
peacekeeping activities in Somalia faced the challenge by a media-savvy warlord, Mohammad Aideed who 
ran a radio station and a newspaper against UN and U.S. 
21Avruch, Narel and and Combelles-Siegel, Information Campaigns for Peace Operations, 2/22/2012, 
15. 
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peacekeeping operations be increased, the message to the population be more easily 
conveyed, and the effect of disinformation campaigns be countered. 
Indeed, there is hope that IODP can significantly contribute to peacekeeping 
operations. The regions where UN peacekeeping missions operate are often called post-
conflict zones.  In these zones, the conflict has usually ceased and the conflicting parties 
are generally more prone to peace than they are to conflict.  Lindley eloquently illustrates 
this distinctive feature of peacekeeping environments:  
Where aggressors are determined, there is little to stop them, but where 
peace and war hang in the balance, there is evidence that information 
operations can coerce violators into better behavior. Combined with the 
clear benefits of explaining the mission, teaching about elections, defusing 
rumors and misperceptions, there are few if any sound reasons to proceed 
with more robust information operations.22 
There is no doubt that the UN missions need public support of the host nations. 
Providing true and reliable information in the fragile structure of post-conflict 
environments is essential in increasing the awareness of the people and thus their support 
through the mission. In any situation that involves natural disasters such as the Haiti 
Earthquake, or human-made disasters, such as Darfur, having access to timely and 
reliable information will save lives, increase cooperation, and allow humanitarian actors 
to have better results.23  The questions then become: Does the UN have favorable IO 
doctrines, policies, and strategies? Contemporary peacekeeping is not simply delivering 
aid to local people and enforcing procedures while providing the people with 
information, but rather it is working with the grassroots of the general public, 
communicating with them, and encouraging them to support the efforts towards the peace 
process.24 Therefore, modern IODP requires a change from traditional understanding of 
being an information provider to becoming a communicator through the local perceptions 
 
                                                 
22Lindley, Untapped Power? the Status of UN Information Operations, 15. 
23Stauffacher et al., ICT for Peace Foundation » Peacebuilding in the Information Age: Sifting Hype 
from Reality, 4. 
24Charles Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace 
OperationsKAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2006), 19. 
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and opinions. As Chapter III shows, this interactive approach not only provides feedback 
from the population but also improves communication between peacekeepers and the 
host nation. 
E. TRUST, INFLUENCE, PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE AND 
COUNTERING DISINFORMATION (THE REACTIVE) 
Trust of local people can be managed and increased during IODP. As mentioned 
above, IODP aims to influence host nations in order to increase their support towards 
peacekeeping activities. If the peacekeepers can gain person-based and category-based 
support from the local population, it will be easier to influence people towards 
peacekeeping goals. Person-based trust can be developed by person-to-person interaction 
over time while category-based trust can be gained through managing the local 
population’s assumptions about the UN and their activities.25 The local population needs 
to be able to identify how UN peacekeepers perceive and act in specific situations. 
Person-to-person and category-based interactions provide information about what the UN 
members are likely to do in specific situations, and this information turns into local 
opinion about what peacekeepers are likely to do on a consistent basis. Overall, trust 
earned from the population can be defined as a mental perception that enables them to 
sense and judge UN peacekeepers and their activities, predict UN members’ behavior in 
certain situations, and help the local population develop a trusting relationship with UN 
personnel, which in turn allows them to act accordingly.26 
Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from trust, influence, 
and attraction. If one can get another to want to do what the first party wants, then the 
first party does not have to use carrots or sticks to make the other individual do it. Trust 
and influence is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences 
tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, 
political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral 
authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. 
                                                 
25Barbara D. Adams and Robert D. G. Webb, “Trust in Small Military Teams,” 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/7th_ICCRTS/Tracks/pdf/006.PDF (accessed 5/25/2012). 
26Ibid. 
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If an individual can be persuaded to go along with another’s purposes without any 
explicit threat or exchange taking place, influence is then at work; however, it would not 
have occurred without that first personal connection.  
The United Nations needs to readjust its outlook on IODP to quickly detour 
disinformation and rumor campaigns that are often propagated by the enemy during post-
conflict operations.  When disinformation or rumor campaigns occur, the primary duty of 
the field officer should be to engage the local media immediately to ensure that 
information is reported as accurately and as honestly as possible with updates provided as 
more information becomes known. Confronting disinformation is a difficult problem in 
the delicate political environment of a peace operation. In fact, responding to the parties’ 
disinformation occasionally seems to be beyond the capabilities and certainly outside the 
perceived mandates. However, disinformation continues to thrive in UN IODP 
campaigns. 
In peace operations the use of force is considered as negative inducement and 
therefore should only be used as a last resort. IODP on the other hand, is one of the most 
important positive inducement tools at a leader’s disposals to convince the people 
towards peace and resolution.27  The United Nations must realize that the enemy, whose 
objective is to influence the insights and perceptions of various target audiences through 
media outlets, is fully aware of the importance of the battle for hearts and minds. To 
combat this enemy objective, UN information officers involved in IODP in post-conflict 
areas need to engage with the media and local population in a very intimate level so that 
these people might perceive peacekeepers as friends.    
According to neuro-economist Paul Zac when among friends, one feels better and 
even gets less sick, because the human body releases oxytocin. Oxytocin, the hormone 
responsible for mother-baby affection is recently discovered to be also responsible for 
stimulating trust and empathy.
28
Zac has discovered that as social animals the human 
                                                 
27Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, 
http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI02Findlay.pdf (accessed 8/22/2012), 7 
28Adam L. Penenberg, “Social Networking Affects Brain Like Falling in Love,” Fast Company (July 
2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/147/doctor-love.html. 
 18 
brain reacts to media interaction the same way they do in physical engagement with 
friends. When an individual is among friends online or in their physical presence, they 
feel better because oxytocin enables him to interact easily and works as a glue to adhere 
him with family, friends, and society. This is why two-way communications and 
interactions are important for IODP. Since the Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), the UN has realized the importance of popular support from host nations 
towards peace and peacekeepers and has since begun using the media to increase this 
support. Earlier the media was used for one-way information, dissemination, and 
propagating but later took on an interactive approach through radio and television call-
ins, text messages, new generation-friendly meetings, and surveys. Following this 
understanding, according to Charles Hunt, the PI sections have become a main element in 
peacekeeping operations and have begun to win the hearts and minds of the host nations 
towards the respective mission and its goals.29 
 
                                                 
29Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 9. 
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III. EVALUATING THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE UN 
IODP INFORMATION SHARING CHALLENGES IN THE UN IODP 
The UN needs to reexamine the strategies it employs to increase the effectiveness 
of its IODP without compromising its transparent nature. Conversely, the UN’s 
organizationally transparent identity hinders it from making use of every benefit of 
intelligence gathering.30 The UN IODP is expected to collect and utilize information in a 
way that is conceptually suitable to its organizational identity. The cultures and values 
within various other organizations that the UN partners with, particularly the military, is 
organically not the same with the values within the humanitarian community. The 
differences in IO philosophy often jeopardize joint cooperation, particularly in 
information sharing. This is extremely evident when the UN participates in joint 
operations with NGO, military, and civilian partners. There is continuous interaction and 
overlap between civilian and military components during peacekeeping. This overlap in 
mission, requirements, and goals involves reciprocal understanding of civilian and 
military elements. According to Avruch et al.: 
Although the UN is a civilian-centric organization, and the military is—in 
principal—commanded by civilian authorities in peacekeeping operations, 
it is the military to generally first arrive in peacekeeping missions and 
therefore, it is key that other actors like NGOs, civilian leaders, UN police 




Additionally, the military elements that take part in peacekeeping activities should 
also understand the different approaches of other actors in peacekeeping efforts and 
readjust their approach towards IODP. For example, during a Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Educational Game Scenario dated January 2010, most of the participants who 
were from humanitarian, governmental, and military communities easily agreed that the 
greatest challenge to the humanitarian affairs during peacekeeping operations was the 
                                                 
30Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 8. 
31Avruch, Narel and Combelles-Siegel, Information Campaigns for Peace Operations. 
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difficulty in information sharing in this rapidly changing environment.
32
 In their report, 
the biggest reason for this difficulty was projected as the huge cultural differences and 
institutional baggage in interagency relations. The military tends to classify most of the 
information as secret, while the NGO members and other humanitarian actors can try to 




The UN IODP typically requires information sharing and transparency, while the 
military IO characteristically requires secrecy, informational security, and intelligence 
gathering. Table 1 illustrates the contrasts of military IO and IODP.   
As to IODP in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) somehow 
managed to address the above-mentioned challenges between civil, military, and police 
units and enabled them to support an agreeable approach towards information 
requirements. The PI sections of military, police and civil units of the mission managed 
to collaborate and assist in bringing the military information sections from secrecy and 
opacity to transparency and information sharing.  
  
                                                 
32Ragnar Carlson, “Humanitarian Operations during Conflict,” CSRS, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, http://www.csrs-nps.org/logistica/public/docs/summer_game_report.pdf (accessed 
2/27/2012). 
33Carlson, “Humanitarian Operations,” 14. 
 21 
    Military IO           IODP 




towards peace and 
negotiations 







Transparency No High 

















Table 1.   A Comparison of Military IO and IODP. 
Although the UN avoids using the terms IO and PSYOPs and prefers PI instead, 
by definition it is not easy to avoid the similarities or commonalities of the terms. For 
example desiring a behavioral change or an intended outcome is not foreign to UN PI 
campaigns. A campaign for Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration, and 
Resettlement is aimed to increase awareness in the population on how it is necessary to 
solve problems without bloodshed and how prevention of violence is essential to 
avoiding ethnic conflicts. The media is normally expected to mirror things as they happen 
or at least with minimal interpretation, in order to stay objective and impartial.  This is 
often where UN information campaigns typically run into problems.  IODP campaigns 
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(as one will see through the examination of the following case studies) often involve 
influence and bias, both attributes that can be camouflaged through truth. Most of the 
information we obtain comes from the media. This includes television, radio, 
newspapers, magazines, and the Internet. We tend to treat the media as important and 
reliable resources for information. So much so that many people may fail to understand 
that news can often be misleading. Although it is clearly naïve to believe that any source 
of information can be truly unbiased, it is necessary for the UN to attempt to maintain as 
much objectivity as possible. Unfortunately, in the United Nations Public Information 
campaigns, the trend has steadily moved towards the mixing of editorial content and 
sensationalism. This is what makes the UN IODP resemble military IO and diverts it 
from a more objective approach to PI campaigns.34 
A. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF IODP 
In the early phases, media usage by the UN was only focused on providing 
information to the local population regarding peacekeeping activities and 
accomplishments. According to Howard, the logic was basic; the media campaigns would 
inform people, and the people would see and understand the facts and make their decision 
on how to behave. The belief was that if the media can enable people to see their world, 
they would choose the way of peace.35 However, in time a more active approach was 
adopted; the media campaigns began aiming at a social outcome: to change the attitudes 
of the people, making them more peace-prone as opposed to conflict-prone. These first 
steps of IODP started as a one-way propaganda method from sender to receiver and 
targeted the public opinion and donors in contributing countries, international media, and 
host nations—in this order. However, thanks to the technological innovations and 
increasing understanding, it evolved through an interactive media activity most primarily 
targeting the host nations of peacekeeping missions. The new approach is more friendly 
and informal as opposed to the formal propaganda stereotype of traditional IODP. 
Besides, the new approach brought a two-way interactive communication with the host 
                                                 
34Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 50. 
35Howard, An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding. 
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nations not only disseminating information, but also enabling feedback from audiences 
through surveys, face-to-face communications, live call-ins, text messages, and emails. 
Evaluation of this feedback facilitated the humanitarian actors to review and update both 
IODP and other humanitarian activities. The United Nations Mission in Liberia and its 
radio were particularly significant in this transitional progress.  
Before the information revolution, IO was typically used to shape psychological 
operations (PSYOPs) resulting in a monopoly of the nation-states over information. The 
nation-states have long enjoyed this monopoly by controlling the media through media 
campaigns, Public Information campaigns, disinformation, and even media censorship to 
opposing forces. However, the rapid technological innovations in information systems 
made one-sided control over media outlets almost impossible. Another effect of these 
technologies was new technology that crossed established state and country boarders. 
New Technology has blurred the borders between the states and decreased the 
effectiveness of customs and other preventive measures by the states. Thanks to the low 
cost, fast, and effective features of information technologies such as the Internet, satellite 
radios, satellite TVs, and cell phones, the information began to pass borders with more 
ease. Other actors also began using IO to counter nation-states’ campaigns as well as to 
propagate their own messages. As Armistead points out, the difference of contemporary 
IO from traditional IO derives from “the availability of low-cost high technology that 
facilitates nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors including 
terrorist groups, to fulfill their own communications.”36 
In the light of the abovementioned developments, the UN and its partners began 
making better use of the contemporary IO tools and technologies in favor of the people of 
the war-torn areas and failing states during peacekeeping operations. The authors of this 
thesis assert that effective usage of IODP helps peacekeeping, community, and other 
humanitarian actors receive more popular support from host nations and therefore make 
better accomplishments in their honorable goals such as helping the vulnerable; 
promoting peace; assisting demobilization, disarming, and reintegrating ex-combatants 
                                                 
36Armistead, Information Operations : Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power.  
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(DDR)37; delivering food, water, medicine, and shelter; clearing mine zones; repatriating 
the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); and saving lives.   
Before the UN’s engagement in IO, several international NGOs conducted several 
activities to increase the awareness in the populations and to transform their attitude 
towards peaceful goals. However, the UN Peacekeeping PI sections became the 
trailblazers in the field and were used as an example by other actors like NATO and the 
EU.38 The UN’s new approach to information operations gradually increased. The first 
attempts were during the Congo and Sinai peacekeeping operations with basic PI 
materials.39The UN managed to explain their presence to the host populations and 
subsequently increased their effectiveness by applying the lessons learned during their 
preceding operations in several countries. In Cambodia, the UN started media 
development tasks in peacekeeping activities. This was the first time, according to 
Howard, that the UN launched a major media development initiative in its support of a 
democratic transition. Before this involvement, the UN rarely engaged in news media 
development and generally did not see it as an important element in conflict resolution.40 
 The IODP in Liberia was revolutionary in several aspects. UNMIL was the first 
example to have an integrated PI section in a UN mission and the PI section utilized a 
two-way interactive approach with the media’s audience. Earlier, in 1992, in the planning 
phase of the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), only a PI specialist was deployed to 
review the media context in a mission area; however, in Liberia, it was not only the 
specialist but also a PI unit who were deployed. In Cambodia, the PI expert appraised the 
coverage of local media, the identities and political affiliations of the media actors, and 
the overall functions of the media in the community.41 These pre-assessments helped 
UNTAC better understand the unique features of the social and media context in the 
                                                 
37DDR is also commonly used as DDRR, representing the third are rehabilitation.   
38Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 11. 
39Ibid., 6. 
40Ross Howard, “Conflict-Sensitive Reporting: State of the Art,” UNESCO, 
http://www.radiopeaceafrica.org/assets/texts/pdf/handbook_conflict-sensitive-reporting_en.pdf (accessed 
5/27/2012), 7 
41Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 27. 
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mission area and thus the requirements for the PI strategy in the beginning of the mission. 
Likewise and even more successfully, during the planning phase, the PI section was sent 
to the UNMIL, and PI personnel launched a robust PI campaign immediately, starting the 
Radio UNMIL broadcast from day one.42 As mentioned above, another revolutionary 
aspect of the Liberia mission was the change in the primary target audience from the 
international media and contributing countries to the host populations. The importance of 
support from the local population was appreciated from the beginning phase of the 
mission. To increase the effectiveness of the PI campaigns, a new approach of 
interactive—two-way—broadcasting was also adopted. Radio UNMIL enabled call-ins 
and text messages, media monitoring unit-fulfilled surveys and other media evaluation 
methods, media outreach, unit-organized friendly meetings with local groups, and 
feedback from the entire audience.  All were observed carefully.  This let the authorities 
plan how to execute incoming operations accordingly, get rid of any shortcomings, and 
have a better understanding of how the mission activities and IODP were perceived by 
local populations. The feedback had another important function as an early warning 
system. It enabled the peacekeepers to sense if there was a likelihood of conflict between 
opposite groups and also if there was a plan against the peacekeepers. It may have 
provided enough time to address the causes of the conflict and apathy or antipathy against 
peacekeepers and take necessary actions.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL AND MEDIA CONTEXT IN POST-
CONFLICT ZONES 
Before judging the UN’s PI campaigns in post-conflict areas it is necessary to 
understand the social structure of the people and the situation of the local media. What 
are the basic layers of the community? What are the intergroup relationships? Who are 
the opinion leaders? What are the basic media outlets, and are they free or under 
suppression from government? Are the media outlets biased or polarized? What is their 
coverage and technological infrastructure? This section analyzes both common features 
of PI campaigns in the post-conflict environments and Chapter IV scrutinizes common 
                                                 
42Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 28. 
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and specific features of each country with an emphasis on similarities and differences in 
the social and media contexts of these countries. A critical analysis of these operations 
identified several major factors that made UN information operations effective or 
ineffective. These factors include whether the UN PI campaigns had influence over all 
key channels of information, had great intelligence “feedback” on their information 
operations, had high-level and centralized control over IO planning, subordinated 
information operations to strategic and operational objectives, maintained adequate 
command and control, and provided sufficient time for Public Information campaign 
execution. These factors are still relevant for today’s operations.  
 Usually media needs to be repaired and supported in the post-conflict times. A 
free, responsible, and sensitive media should be created and supported in order to raise 
awareness in the nation, reduce the tension between groups, and improve the bonds 
within the civil society. This type of journalism is called “Conflict Resolution 
Journalism” or “Peace Journalism” by the Center for Journalism Ethics.43 
Although the media is expected to be impartial, telling only the truth, it is used in 
Information Operations as a tactic to affect the hearts and minds of the targeted people. 
For example, as a mouthpiece of a UN mission, a UN radio station in a post-conflict 
region logically intends to increase optimism in the host nation; therefore, this station 
should not be expected to highlight any shortcomings of the peacekeepers or in case the 
conflict escalates, this station is not supposed to mirror this escalation. It will 
understandably try to calm down the population and understate the conflict.  In IODP, the 
media should be used as a tool for peace and development goals; therefore, this thesis 
assumes that it is not an ethical dilemma that the selective reporting compromises the 
media’s impartiality for the reason that media is being used for a greater good.  
Some local media outlets cannot live up to their professed values. Because of the 
lack of education and low incomes of novice journalists, local media may tend to spread 
                                                 
43 Stephen J. A. Ward http://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/resources/global-media-ethics/journalism-and-
conflict-resolution/. 
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rumors and myth.44 This type of biased media does little to reduce the ethnic tension and 
can, in fact, exacerbate it.  Turkish and Greek relations in Cyprus have long undergone 
ethnic tension.  According to Georgios Terzis, ninety-five percent of Turkish people feel 
that Greeks are not to be trusted even though ninety-three percent have never actually met 
a Greek, while seventy-three percent of Greek people feel that Turks are not to be trusted 
with seventy percent of them having never actually met a Turk. Among the other factors, 
much of this bias stems from the local media’s misrepresentation of both sides.45 
Additionally, some media outlets can be used by spoilers against other groups and even 
peacekeepers. It is also a necessity to counter spoilers’ antagonistic media campaigns, 
such as Serbian radio and television programs in Kosovo, and warlords’ such as 
Somalia’s General Aidid’s radio station, Voice of the Somali People.  
Local media is generally under suppression of the state in post-conflict countries, 
and therefore journalists must attempt to refrain from criticizing the government’s 
activities. Even advertisers in some countries hesitate to work with impartial or critical 
media because of the fear of retaliation from their government. As for UN media outlets, 
they use a peaceful diplomatic language thereby eschewing any direct criticism of the 
government. However, an organization such as the UN should support the local media, 
emphasize freedom of the press, and advise the local government on being open to 
criticism.  
It is also hard for local media to get rid of the notoriety garnered in times of 
conflict. During the conflict, the media is generally used as a mouthpiece of the warlords 
or faction leaders making the media aggressive, partisan, and polarized and subsequently 
making the society less tolerant and less democratic. The impartial media members, or 
those on the opposing side, are commonly persecuted and detained by opposite groups or 
government forces. This makes the belligerent leaders a predominant source of 
information during the conflict and increases fear of these leaders. Other media are 
                                                 
44Mary Myers, “Voices from Villages: Community Radio in the Developing World,” 
http://www.radiopeaceafrica.org/assets/texts/pdf/2011_CIMA-Community_Radio-Report_Final_EN.pdf 
(accessed 5/26/2012), 12. 
45Georgios Terzis, “Mediatizing Peace “ http://www.waccglobal.org/en/20074-communicating-
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covertly allied with some factions and politicized accordingly. It is not possible for the 
media to remain unbiased when they have survived a protracted conflict, nor is it possible 
to report about the conflict without the personal bias and effects of previous events. It is 
difficult for the local media to overcome the erosion in the public trust after 
conflict.46During the Liberia conflict for example, the media had employed self-
censorship due to the fear of warlords and carried out the duty as was dictated by these 
warlords; consequently, it was difficult in the post-conflict times for the media to regain 
the trust of the populace.  
C. THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN PEACEKEEPING 
The media has huge productive and damaging effects over population before, 
during, and after conflict. Before a conflict, states or belligerent groups largely use the 
media to exacerbate hatred and increase the cause of war. During the conflict, it can 
provoke people towards violence: for example, Hitler used the media to create hatred 
against Jews and homosexuals; Yugoslavian media provoked ethnic groups against each 
another during the Bosnian War; likewise, Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM) in Rwanda called people of the majority, the Hutus, to kill the minority, the 
Tutsis.47 After the conflict, the media can be used for peace and development goals. 
Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, best explains its role when he states, “By 
giving voice and visibility to all people—including and especially the poor, the 
marginalized, and members of minorities—the media can help remedy the inequalities, 
the corruption, the ethnic tensions, and the human rights abuses that form the root causes 
of so many conflicts.”48 The media can also arouse consciousness about peace and link 
the peacekeepers to the host nation. As Bratic successfully illustrates, the media has 
much bigger influence than direct methods that are used in peacekeeping. Mediation and 
 
 
                                                 
46Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 21 
47Bratic and Scrich, Why and when to use the Media for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 7 
48Georgios Terzis, “Mediatizing Peace “ http://www.waccglobal.org/en/20074-communicating-
peace/472-Mediatizing-peace.html (accessed 5/27/2012). 
 29 
negotiation processes can reach two to twenty people; training, twenty to fifty people; 
and arts-based processes, fifty to one thousand people, but mass media approaches can 
reach thousands of people.49 
Information is power, and in the hands of the UN it can be power for peace.50 UN 
peacekeepers that lack knowledge are often vulnerable, ineffective, and incapable of 
protecting themselves or the people they are deployed to assist in the peacekeeping 
process. Information Operations is also one of the elements of power used by the 
international community’s political and military leaders to shape the operational 
environment, deter potential conflicts, and resolve crises. The application of IO can be 
effective and may be expanded in the future. One of the main objectives of Information 
Operations during peacekeeping is to assist the host country in post-conflict situations 
while also trying to earn their trust and confidence. However, developing friendships to 
“win hearts and minds” is unrealistic; history shows us that trust of the United Nations 
Public Information campaigns during post-conflict re-stabilization is not great around the 
world. Nevertheless, the Information Operation campaign’s goal of earning the trust and 
respect of the silent majority is a goal that could be accomplished as trust and respect 
mobilize action.   
“A 2008 United States Institute of Peace review proposed that the media can 
provide a great number of options in conflict resolution. Some of these options are 
professional journalism capacity-building; citizen and community-based media 
development and grass-roots interests; intentional peace-promoting media, particularly 
using entertainment formats; and advertising, commercial messaging, and other overt 
attempts to influence public attitudes.”51 Using most of these opportunities, the 
overarching goal of the United Nations IODP is to convince the silent majority of the 
post-conflict society that their interest contributes to peace and negotiations and not to the 
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conflict.The successful United Nations IODP has always emphasized reporting the truth 
(good and bad) to the population to establish trust and respect. Informed citizens acting 
on open source information can make a difference. (Successes and failures of this will be 
found in case studies.)  However, there are challenges that the UN needs to address: 
• The UN should avoid being vulnerable to electronic communications and 
“collection-centric” methods by utilizing a list of requirements to analyze 
data, definition of requirements, collection management, post-processing, and 
sense-making. As a matter of fact, in Liberia and Kosovo, the UN was able to 
make progress in the list of requirements. However, because of limited media 
access of the UN IODP in Ethiopia, implementing and enforcing these 
requirements were difficult. 
• Understanding how to craft the right IO message requires background 
information about the culture and social structure.52 It is not possible to craft 
or deliver the right message to the right person at the right time in the right 
context without first understanding tribes, villages, and neighborhoods—in 
other words, the audience of the message.  UN IO officers need to work 
extensively at developing a friendly and respectable working environment 
within the population to ensure that the peacekeeping influence becomes a 
strategic opportunity within the local media. Holistically adapting training 
efforts on how to gain trust and influence within the indigenous population 
will enhance UN IODP capabilities to generate actionable intelligence at the 
lowest possible level across the force. Ongoing training initiatives will 
empower the UN IODP to obtain and retain knowledge of the culture and 
background of the indigenous people, and this in turn will provide insight into 
the basic values and motivations that are more than likely to affect population 
activity and behavior. Understanding the climate of the conflict requires a 
deep appreciation of the society in which it occurs. By creating detailed IO 
strategies and diligently monitoring the population’s disposition within the 
country through clandestine human intelligence, civil affairs, humanitarian 
assistance, et cetera, we can significantly improve intelligence and combat 
spoilers through effective IO.  
• In order to keep pace with technological developments, the organizational 
fogginess must be addressed.  Today’s technology enables journalists to 
broadcast an ongoing incident live (providing they are on the ground). While 
witnessing an incident, journalists just need to set up a satellite phone to break 
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the news to their central offices. In a matter of minutes, the news may reach 
wide international audiences. By comparison, the UN IODP flow of 
information is much slower. Indeed, faced with the same incident, an officer 
will report the situation to his immediate higher headquarters. This process 
will be repeated until the information reaches a high enough level at 
headquarters where the information can be cleared for public release.53 
Providing UN IODP target audiences—international and local media and local 
population, accurate, information is the key element of success during post-conflict re-
stabilization.  To provide complete, accurate, and timely information to the media, IODP 
needs to maintain a rapid information flow and thus be closely tied into conventional 
operations. Specifically, PI officers need to have close association with their commanders 
to be kept informed of plans, operations, and incidents as they unfold, and to be allowed 
to release information quickly to the press.  The same understanding should also be 
established between the PI section and higher authorities for the new trend of two-way 
interactive communication.   
Humanitarian intervention requires decentralization of command and control so 
that personnel are free to act on their own initiative within broad mission guidelines. 
Currently UN personnel are over-constrained by the need to ask up the chain of command 
for permission to act on even relatively routine matters.54 For the local population, 
immediacy can override accuracy; for the UN IODP, accuracy can override immediacy. 
Chapter IV will employ a comparative case study design that examines the United 
Nations Information Operations during peacekeeping in Kosovo, Liberia, and Eritrea-
Ethiopia. These cases were chosen based on the United Nations’ most recent activities in 
Information Operations and information systems during peacekeeping operations. These 
cases date between 1999 to the present. Additionally, the United Nations still maintains a 
presence in all four case studies selected and utilizes Information Operations during 
Peacekeeping. 
These cases will be assessed based on the following criteria:  
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• One-Way Information Dissemination Versus Two-Way Information 
Dissemination 
• Data Integrity (Accuracy) Versus Data Inaccuracy 
• Ability to Disseminate Information Versus Inability to Disseminate 
Information 
• Management Support to Improve Information Systems with Users Versus 
Nonsupport 
• Resource Allocation Versus Lack of Resources for IO Implementation 
This thesis acknowledges the existence of several limitations of this design.  The 
conclusions drawn from these cases may not apply or fit similar cases in other parts of the 
world.  There are likely to be variations due to many factors such as the nature of the 
conflict, its timing, and factors unique to the historical patterns and contextual features. 
The following empirical observations will be examined accordingly through case studies 
of IODP that involved information dissemination, resource allocations, population 
support, and government stability.  There is a consensus in the research literature that 
identifies when UN Public Information campaigns are unsuccessful, and this exists when 
the following conditions are present: 
• A politically rigid host nation where a “pseudo-democracy” is most likely to 
fail 
• An instance where actions do not match the narrative  
• An occurrence where a lack of trust develops between the host nation and 
sponsors 
We chose to examine the following empirical observations through case studies of 
successful or working Public Information campaigns that involved trust and influence 
through population support, information dissemination, data integrity, and resource 
allocation.  The observations above outline observed empirical patterns from each case.  
Although we keep in mind that every post-conflict situation is unique and PI 
initiatives should address these exclusive features per se, there are also some 
commonalities and patterns across all post-conflict zones. Besides the reflection of 
specific contextual features of each country, it is equally prudent to understand these 
common features and patterns as they are seen in such complications as social structure 
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and media texture, hatred between rival groups, poverty, underdevelopment, low literacy 
rates, and high unemployment rates. For example, after a conflict, the unemployment 
rates increased in Liberia to eighty-five percent.55 Due to many factors that are examined 
below in the following chapter, the post-conflict environments lack a credible and 
effective local media to disseminate essential information to population even during an 
increased need for them.56 
The main apparatuses used in PI campaigns are the visual, audio, electronic, and 
printed media. In order to disseminate information to a targeted audience, newspapers 
radio, television, and the Internet are used as the main instruments. Television and the 
Internet have had superiority in media campaigns due to the visual and entertaining 
features of the former and the additional speed of the latter. Unlike the European post-
conflict environment of Kosovo, radio has been the most predominant channel in the 
missions in Africa. Therefore in three of our case studies: Kosovo, Liberia, and Eritrea- 
Ethiopia, radio has been significantly used due to the fact that the literacy levels are still 
too low in these countries, and rural areas are beyond the coverage of television and 
internet signals. Big portions of the population in these countries cannot afford to buy 
TVs nor internet devices and services.  Because of such scenarios, UN agencies and other 
international actors become the main source of advertising revenue for the media outlets 
in post-conflict countries.57 Radio is also effective in means of advertising because it 
holds less advertising cost compared to those of television and newspapers.  
Another aspect of the usage of media in peacekeeping is that the peace processes 
comprise the serious job of news programming and public awareness campaigns. In order 
to overcome the shortcomings of these tasks, it is possible, as well as necessary, to make 
it enjoyable to the audience. As Howard puts it, the usage of media in peacekeeping 
should not be confined into traditional areas but rather should extend into entertaining 
                                                 




avenues of the media like popular music, soap operas, live radio or television programs 
with call-ins, concerts, and street theaters.58 
It is also equally important to cause no harm to the weak and vulnerable local 
media. The efficiency and impartiality of the Public Information campaigns enable them 
to reach their goals; however, this also causes a bad effect over the local media 
institutions. The UN radio programming in particular tends to be the favorite media 
channel among local populations and therefore decreases the popularity and revenue of 
the local contenders. Since the mission is there to cause no harm to local institutions, and 
is not permanent in the area, the competition against local counterparts should be 
balanced. There should also be an exit strategy in order to ensure that there will be no 
deprivation in the media texture when the mission is shut down. Media outlets such as 
mission radio stations should therefore not be in a hurry to air an end-of-broadcast. 
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IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS IN KOSOVO, 
LIBERIA, AND ERITREA-ETHIOPIA 
A. CASE BACKGROUND AND EXAMINATION OF THE UN 
APPLICATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS FOR 
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN IODP CASE STUDIES 
Chapter IV discusses a number of challenges identified as needing consideration 
by the UN IODP. This chapter will report the key findings from efforts made to 
understand the informational needs within three case studies regarding information and 
influence operations in UN Public Information campaigns.  This overview of the UN 
IODP, based largely on secondary sources, points to several fundamental, overlapping 
themes. First, inadequate information on the local population and culture, that is the lack 
of a proper analysis of the target audience, proved to be one of the greatest obstacles to 
effective influence operations efforts. This lack of sufficient information led to bland 
messages that did not resonate with specific target audiences and made it difficult to 
compete with adversaries more capable of exploiting the local information environment.  
Second, in addition to the obvious socio-political and cultural differences among the 
cases, there is a difference in the attitudes of the target populations. In Kosovo and 
Liberia, the local populations were considerably more favorable and open minded toward 
the UN IODP and thus more receptive to their messages than was the population in 
Ethiopia. Third, the goodwill of a population can easily dry up in the absence of tangible 
progress in such areas as reconstruction and security. The UN IODP had a smaller margin 
of error in Ethiopia than it did in Kosovo and Liberia, making the influence operations 
effort in Ethiopia considerably more challenging.  
Current UN IO doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that 
Information Operations provide in the building of trust and influence, the importance of 
integrating Information Operations within all levels of conventional operations, and in the 
influencing of a population’s belief for or against disinformation from the adversary. In 
short, this chapter highlights the important role that information operations played in the 
UN’s PI campaigns in Kosovo, Liberia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia. 
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 UN IODP efforts during these three case studies significantly helped—and 
occasionally hurt—population support for the peace process. Information operations can 
have the same impact for today’s UN IODP if the lessons of the past are applied. As it 
was done in Cambodia and Liberia, the context sensitivity should be handled with care. 
The social and media context should be appraised in the planning phase in order to 
understand the audience and program an effective PI strategy.59 
The dilemma of media impartiality and peace reporting is a very important 
challenge in IODP.  Ethically, media is supposed to be free, honest, and impartial, and 
therefore needs to report both sides of the story. However, it is almost impossible for UN 
media tools to criticize the UN or highlight the downsides of peacekeeping activities if 
there are any.  Nor, is it realistic to expect a UN media tool to take the side of a spoiler 
party, even in the case that the party is right in that subject. In fact, these operations 
logically intend to stimulate a psychological effect within the population to jump start a 
positive belief in the population and improve it. In other words, the media is used as a 
tool and information as a tactic. As the belief in peace and trust in peacekeepers increases 
in the hearts and minds of the people, it will progressively increase the belief in the 
success of peace. Once a majority of the people believes that the peace process will 
succeed, it will have a snowball effect over the popular support towards peacekeeping 
which the UN certainly needs. However, the divide between impartiality and selective 
reporting should be balanced, and persuasiveness of the UN and its media tools should be 
maintained. If the IODP exaggerates praising UN activities, it may lose persuasiveness, 
and people may begin thinking that the broadcast is unrealistic.  Therefore, the UN’s 
organizational sensitivity towards ethics, impartiality, democracy, equality, non-
discrimination, and human rights and freedoms should be demonstrated in all aspects of 
the PI campaigns.  
These case studies will examine the role of Information Operation campaigns in 
Kosovo, Liberia, and Ethiopia-Eritrea, and the tools they used to deploy their messages. 
Additionally, these case studies will focus on their public outreach strategies utilizing 
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radio and television outlets.  This chapter will reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Public Information campaigns and Information Operations within the respective case 
studies, evaluate the communication tolls and strategies that were employed, and make 
recommendations for improvement.  
An effective Public Information campaign can incorporate this knowledge about 
the population into actions and develop methods and tactics to appeal to or satisfy any 
number of the Hierarchy of Needs influencing individuals in order to succeed IODP. This 
is not easy by any stretch of the imagination. When looking at the potential target 
audience’s needs, IODP must consider and understand the environment and culture. 
Understanding human dimension goes far beyond cultural awareness and leads to 
understanding values and norms. The difficulties associated with using the Hierarchy of 
Needs within Information Operations are not insurmountable, and the Public Information 
campaign that recognizes and satisfies these needs is the one most likely to gain 
significant influence over the population.  
B. HIERARCHY OF NEEDS REVISITED 
This section will explore several factors that lead to the conclusion of the 
importance and relevance of the Hierarchy of Needs as an Information Operations tactic: 
the nature of Public Information campaigns in peacekeeping, social and media context in 
post-conflict zones, and the technology used to convey messages. People create theories 
and models about most everything—it helps individuals understand. For example, 
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs helps to explain how a human being’s needs motivate him. 
Similar to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs the Information Operations’ pyramid 
highlighted in Figure  shows that it is important to take IO into account when examining 
the needs, desires, and wants of a target audience. The number one rule in Information 
Operations is to engage with people; this is how one moves up the pyramid. It takes time 
and effort but can pay off in return. 
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs states that one must satisfy each need in turn 
starting with the first, which deals with the most obvious needs for survival itself. Only 
when the lower order needs of physical and emotional well-being are satisfied are we 
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concerned with the higher order needs of influence and personal development. 
Conversely, if the things that satisfy an individual’s lower order needs are swept away, 
they are no longer concerned about the maintenance of their higher order needs. All 
human beings have social needs, and to have a good, successful, happy life, one needs to 
socialize with others and feel part of a network.  Because humans are by nature social 
beings, it is good for them to live in a society in which the social life is mostly based on a 
community or social network. For this reason Aristotle espouses that social life in a 
community is a necessity for an individual’s complete flourishing as a human being.60 
One of the most difficult things for people to do is give up control and relinquish 
“power” to the masses unless they can see tangible gains.  It is the single largest barrier to 
accepting and adopting a process that is different to one an individual has been 
conditioned to use. Such is the case for the following case studies: Kosovo, Liberia, and 
Eritrea-Ethiopia. All three missions faced problems and successes when applying the 
Hierarchy of Needs through an Information Operations application and analysis. 
C. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: 
Tensions between the Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo simmered 
throughout the twentieth century and occasionally erupted into major violence, 
particularly during the First Balkan War, World War I, and World War II. During the 
winter of 1999, the ensuing war for Kosovo was telecastaround the world, with millions 
of people watching the conflict in real time.  
Information Operations played a key role in the Kosovo crisis, since, as a 
precondition, the entire Balkan region was plagued by religious and ethnic turmoil. The 
intense emotions that were systemic there created new challenges for the forces that were 
attempting to develop peace and stability. The key messages that emerged in the 
subsequent IO campaign suggested that the only way to a better future for the inhabitants 
of the region was through tolerance and cooperation and that the combined strength of the 
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community was greater than its parts. Information Operations themes aimed to reinforce 
the idea that tolerance and cooperation meant a better standard of living and a safer future 
for everyone.61 
If a state loses its ability to regulate an ethnic conflict, the problem becomes a 
structural security dilemma because it could invite external intervention. Thus ethnic 
conflict poses a security dilemma along two dimensions: States which act out with 
aggressive behavior as a consequence of internal cleavages and transnational ethnic 
affinities; and States in which internal weakness leads to efforts to avoid external 
involvement. The result is a de-legitimization of the State authority and an opening in the 
political process for opposing factions. This was the case in Kosovo, prior to United 
Nations intervention. 
On September 23, 1998, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 demanding that all parties in Kosovo 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cease hostilities and 
maintain a ceasefire. The UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was faced with the 
absence of an effective, central government. Without State institutions, Kosovo’s two 
primary ethnic groups were Albanians and Serbs.62 
Extremist elements frequently used the friction created along such fault lines to 
instigate interethnic violence and to threaten Kosovo’s fragile peace. The irreconcilable 
differences between these two societies affected every aspect of UNMIK’s civilian 
missions. To influence the populace, the UNMIK had to influence Albanian and Serb 
organizations and the individuals and groups within them. This was accomplished 
through proper information dissemination, data integrity, improvement and protection of 
information systems, and proper resource allocation. 
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1. Hierarchy of Needs 
The system of human needs from bottom to top—shelter, safety, leadership, 
community, competence and trust—are dependent on one’s ability to connect with 
others.  Belonging to a community provides the sense of security and agency which 
fosters happiness and helps one feel safe; belonging is the driving force of human 
behavior. Sometimes the desire for safety outweighs the desire to easily satisfy 
physiological needs.  For example, during the Kosovo War, many residents of Kosovo 
chose to inhabit a secure area instead of an insecure area, the latter having more definite 
access to food. For example, Maslow says: 
Assured safety permits higher needs and impulses to emerge and to grow 
towards mastery. To endanger safety, means regression backward to the 
more basic foundation. What this means is that in the choice between 
giving up safety or giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out. Safety 
needs are proponent over growth needs…In general, only a child who 
feels safe dares to grow forward healthily. His safety needs must be 
gratified. He can't be pushed ahead, because ungratified safety needs will 
remain forever underground, always calling for satisfaction…63 
2. Operating Environment 
The mandate of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1244 (1999).  The 
Mission is mandated to help ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo and advance regional stability in the western Balkans. The Mission 
is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who enjoys civilian 
executive power as vested in him by the Security Council in resolution 1244 (1999).  The 
Special Representative ensures a coordinated approach by the international civil presence 
operating under UNSC resolution 1244, including the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which retains the status of UNMIK's pillar for institution 
building. The Special Representative also ensures coordination with the head of the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which has operational 
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responsibility in the area of rule of law. EULEX is deployed under Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) and operates under the overall authority of the United Nations.64 
State media played an important role in the Kosovo conflict. Earlier, throughout 
Yugoslavia media was a powerful tool in the hands of the regime to control the public 
opinion. Only in very few regions were there independent media operating. Therefore, 
their influence could not have been compared to the influence of state-owned media.65 
3. Information Dissemination 
To understand Information Operations in a mission, it is useful to have a general 
grasp of the media situation in that country. Likewise in order to understand the role of 
UNMIK in the context of Kosovo, it is beneficial to understand what authority granted by 
the mission mandate to UNMIK in regard to the establishment of a free and independent 
local media, and to ensure a secure environment for all residents. Until the early 1990s 
there was no Albanian broadcaster in Kosovo’s media sector: the Serbian government 
strictly limited broadcast to the authorities in Belgrade and the broadcasts made from the 
Serbian government in Belgrade had little credibility with the Kosovo Albanian 
population. Therefore, satellite television proved to be an innovative way to translate 
messages to the Albanian population. In 1993, Albanian radio stations Koha and Radio 
21 were permitted to broadcast. After the signing of UN Resolution 1244 media outlets 
were permitted to restart under the Resolution which established UNMIK and gave the 
mission legislative and executive authority in Kosovo.66 Under this resolution UNMIK 
was able to use Radio Television Priština (RTP), the largest State-run media outlet in 
Kosovo, for Information Operations campaigns. 
Even in the early phases of the intervention, the need for information was 
undertaken in Kosovo. Media Action International, an international NGO, provided 
humanitarian information to the people of Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia during the 
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NATO campaigns.67 In this media intervention, radio was used as the most practical and 
cost effective media tool; wind-up radios were delivered to the people of the refugee 
camps. This helped people stay connected to the information provided by humanitarian 
actors even when they lacked electricity in the refugee camps and homes.  
Led by the international team, daily television programming was also developed.  
Programs were initially aired only two hours a day on satellite television. The BBC 
provided staff training and equipment to the station RTP, and UNMIK’s television unit 
contributed a five to seven minute news round-up broadcast twice a day in Albanian and 
twice a week in Serbian. UNMIK’s daily news broadcasts continued for one and a half 
years.68 As the second network of the RTP, Radio Blue Sky was established by 
UNMIK.69 In order to address the urgent information needs of the local population, 
Radio Blue Sky broadcasted in Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish enabling open dialogue 
and democratic discussions within and between these local groups. By the end of 2001, 
the management of Radio Television Priština had completely transitioned to the local 
population. 
The Kosovo crisis also presented a new challenge for Information Operations 
campaigns. This was the first war broadcast on the Internet and preliminary judgments 
were that the Serbs completely outwitted UN PI on this new communications technology. 
They not only used e-mail containing macro-viruses to disrupt PI computers as part of 
their information warfare, but they also used the Internet to refute UN Information 
Operations campaigns to get their own arguments across when these were not being 
covered by the Western media. For example, the UN IODP encountered several groups 
that were resistant to PI campaigns, and therefore the leaders of UNMIK failed. These 
spoilers wanted to undermine the security environment, and they largely used word of 
mouth to achieve this aim. Specifically, they spread rumors about UN operations causing 
civilian casualties and greatly exaggerated local conflicts in order to undercut the feeling 
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of safety in the region. As Siegel states, “When someone talks to you for 24 hours about 
intolerance, about how Serbs and Albanians are different, and how they jeopardize each 
other...then at the end you start believing it.”70 
Accurate information on the local situation is vital to the success of both 
humanitarian and military missions. Charged with rebuilding and/or creating civil 
institutions ranging from the police to a working government, UNMIK oversaw activities 
by the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). Although the intervention restored order, saved lives, and muddled 
through; poor coordination, overlapping jurisdiction, and gaps in authority created serious 
problems.71 
Modern technology, in this scenario, increased the range, effectiveness, 
productivity, and success of the UN IODP.  Therefore, Kosovo serves as an example of 
lessons learned in policy and Information Operations coupled with the successes and 
shortfalls within the Balkan peacekeeping effort.  
4. Two-Way Information Dissemination 
Two-way information dissemination in Kosovo took place on several platforms, 
for example, print media, electronic media in the forms of radio and television, and the 
Internet. The UNMIK website worked as a form of two-way information dissemination. 
This is because the web is a highly cost effective medium of dissemination from the point 
of view of an organization. From the users’ perspective, access to the information 
UNMIK provided on their website produced quick information.  This was important 
especially when quick interaction with UNMIK was necessary. Additionally, the UN 
IODP was able to access private newspapers and television channels, attend citizens’ hall 
meetings, and assist in the development and execution of cultural events—all forums in 
which they took the opportunity to communicate with the local population. However, the 
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UN IODP was not always particularly effective in getting support from the local 
population. For example, public authorities, particularly at the local level, saw the UN 
IODP communication as a way to disseminate and diffuse information through a 
traditional media approach. There is much to do to transform communication from a one-
way dissemination tool to an instrument for two-way interaction.  For the UN IODP to be 
successful, more meaningful engagement had to take place among actors at all levels, 
both local and international.  Establishing relationships based on trust was and still is 
essential. A key aspect of building trust was for the local population to break from the 
past and use communication to engage in a consultative dialogue.  The UN IODP was 
able to partially combat State media propaganda by utilizing private and independent 
media outlets and the Internet in the larger areas in Kosovo. With the increased usage of 
e-mail and the Internet throughout the war, the UN IODP was able to utilize social media 
to spread their message. For example, the UN IODP was able to spread their message of 
enforcing and supporting democratic, fair and non-discriminating mandates, laws, and 
rules through embracing and enjoying all cultures, races, and individual styles.  The 
Information Operations campaign’s primary contribution to mission accomplishment lay 
in the continued support for or neutrality toward UNMIK-led operations in the 
contributing nations. Throughout operations, international and national public opinions 
showed either support or neutrality toward the mission. No major political controversy 
emerged at the government level either between the executive and legislative bodies or 
the government and political activists during the accomplishment of UNMIK. 
Internal coordination enabled the Command to send a unified message, made it 
less likely that different staffs would develop divergent plans, and facilitated the 
integration of the Information Operations campaign with other tools in the commander’s 
arsenal. UNMIK’s key task in northern Kosovo remains engaging with and mediating 
between these communities, as well as serving as a bridge between northern Kosovo and 





conduct combat operations, the leader has to place a greater reliance on non-lethal 
weapons. While every unit has some capability in this realm, PI and PSYOP are two 
critical, non-lethal weapons.72 
5. Resource Allocation 
Information has played a critical role in the success of the operations in Kosovo. 
As in any military endeavor, public support is central to mission accomplishment and the 
Public Information campaign was tasked with gaining and maintaining broad 
understanding for the IODP mission.  However, there were problems with how each 
coalition member viewed information dissemination. Even the three major contributors—
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—had different approaches to PI 
operations. One set of problems arose from different views on the amount of information 
that should be released to the media. At times the various organizations within the UN 
did not effectively understand their operational environment, which resulted in an 
inability to secure the population as the Public Information campaigns were unable to 
effectively influence change.  A properly executed PI not only links one’s deeds and 
actions with words, but it also is a must for an entity to influence both its desired and 
unintended demographics.  This should be done simultaneously or sometimes 
sequentially in order to effectively maximize the power of influence among the direct and 
indirect target audiences.   
D. THE LIBERIA CONFLICT 
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was authorized on September 
19, 2003. Tasked with a big mandate, including implementing a ceasefire, supporting 
humanitarian activities, observing human right issues, and reforming national security 
and police, UNMIL needed to have an effective PI campaign.  The PI section of the 
mission found a degraded local media with untrained employees, inaccessible rural areas, 
and a climate of illiteracy and rumors.73 Therefore, the PI section ran capacity-building 
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activities including wide range training programs in order develop a more informed, 
disciplined, and ethically sensitive media.  
Because the sensitive political background of post-conflict zones requires a more 
sensitive and flexible approach, UNMIL was founded as a civilian-led mission which has 
been a new trend in contemporary UN missions74. This understanding had positive 
effects on PI approaches too. The new developments also revealed the fact that 
intelligence and information-handling approaches in PI operations require more 
coordination and information-sharing approaches while lessening the need for secrecy 
and information security.  
The mission was welcomed by the parties of the conflict as well as the people. 
However after suffering a long-term conflict and without knowing whom to trust, it was 
not easy for the community that was vulnerable to be affected by rumors and false 
information. Therefore one of the primary jobs of the PI campaign in Liberia was to 
protect the mission from these rumors and unjustified criticism and address the confusion 
in the minds of the population.75UNMIL media monitoring units worked as an early 
warning system for all levels of humanitarian workers and kept them informed about the 
daily developments in the country. They monitored and analyzed the local and 
international media, provided outlined information about the external perception of the 
UN, and facilitated mission peace processes and regional security issues.76 Therefore, 
well informed about the propaganda of media spoilers and bad publicity, the decision-
making mechanisms in Liberia earned time to rapidly respond in order to counter the 
potential bad effects within the population.  
The media-monitoring unit also interpreted the feedback from the population on 
how they perceived and were affected by the mission activities such as elections and 
DDRR programs. This allowed the mission leaders to maintain and update their activities 
and strategies in accordance with requirements and security needs of the all the 
                                                 




employees since the perceptions of the mission by the local population were also a 
security issue for mission personnel and assets.77 
1. Hierarchy of Needs 
As Maslow espoused in his Hierarchy of Needs theory, the instinctive need of 
humans to make the most of their unique abilities cannot come into play until their basic 
physiological needs are met. In Liberia, basic needs such as clean water, food, and proper 
living conditions were not being met. Unlike Kosovo, where it was possible to give up 
freedom for security and food, Liberians had neither option. Poverty is one of the most 
common problems in post-conflict countries, and economic deprivations impose a lot of 
limitations on the media industry as it does on almost every other aspect of daily life. The 
poverty of the people and the State decreases the main revenues of the media that derive 
from advertising and sales. Furthermore crooked politics also have had bad consequences 
on the media. In Liberia, local advertisers generally avoid nonpartisan media because of 
the fear from incumbent authorities.78 This undermines the ethos of the media and favors 
the big international actors who can easily transcend local economic problems while 
disregarding the potential repercussions from the government.  
2. Operating Environment 
In Liberia, literacy rates are very low, which keeps radio as still the most 
predominant source of PI campaigns. After a conflict, the Liberian illiteracy rates in 
adults reached its peak in 2006 with eighty percent.79 Another reason for radio to be the 
most popular form of media is that most Liberian people cannot afford to buy televisions 
and computers; the infrastructure for radio requires less time and funds, and the 
electricity grid is not developed enough to provide twenty-four hour electricity in the 
most rural parts. Television and Internet usage in Africa are confined to the people who 
are in the coverage range, which generally means the capitols and big cities, while the 
newspapers are confined to the literate people and their friends and families to whom 
                                                 




they read the newspapers aloud or summarize the news they read. In addition, the 
newspapers cannot reach large populations within the continent. Although radio is the 
most convenient media tool in African countries and there are numerous private and 
governmental radio stations throughout the region, the radio broadcasting has a lot of 
shortcomings.  In most of the African countries, the local radio channels face a lack of 
proficiency in journalism and programming, successful transmission capabilities, and 
effective infrastructure, not to mention interference from the local governments.  
In Liberia, people do not trust the local media. Due to problems such as a lack of 
proficiency, sensational reporting, bad image in public memory of media from the 
conflict years, and bad quality of local media work, the Liberian people present more 
trust towards international media. Therefore, in Liberia, international news authorities 
such as CNN, al Jazeera, and BBC are perceived to be more honest and trustworthy. This 
further increases the leverage of the international media and decreases the leverage of 
local Liberian media in the role of being a means of democratic checks and balances over 
the local governments.80 
Rural community radio stations were an exception to this. Given the ability to run 
on small budgets and considering the low literacy rates in the country, Liberian rural 
community radio earned the trust of the communities they serve.  Belonging to rural 
community groups, running for the benefits of these groups, operating on tiny budgets, 
and covering the issues that are discounted by commercial and State radios, these types of 
media outlets seemed to be worthy of support by UNMIL. As Myer states, even though 
this type of broadcast required fewer funds, they were still in need of support by 
international actors.81 
Due to the abovementioned deficits in television and the press, these sectors are 
generally underdeveloped in Liberia. The newspapers and magazines are lacking quality 
content. Some of the publications can only be published when they can find enough 
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advertising for each edition.82 Furthermore, the culture of sharing one newspaper among 
several people reduces the potential of income, albeit its increase in audience. As for 
local TV broadcasting, despite this tool having the potential to better influence the 
audience with its audio-visual presentation, the sector remains immature due to the 
limited coverage, audience, and lack of technology and competition.  
Having less effect over government, less outreach in the population, and little 
hope and capacity to recover, the local media in a country has a tendency to go for soft 
journalism.  The local government and other internal actors seem incapable to address 
these problems; thus UNMIL PI sections adopted a solid capacity-building strategy for 
the local media. This strategy included advertisement giving, training, editing, auditing, 
and direct logistical support.  
Fortunately video clubs emerged in this country,83 and the PI section successfully 
utilized this opportunity in means of disseminating the message of the mission to the 
population as well as having feedback from the population. The peacekeepers watched 
movies, news programs, and even football matches with the local people; they drank tea 
with them and had friendly chats after the show. This let the locals think more about the 
peace and negotiations. After earning their trust and becoming familiar with them, the PI 
section brought their own short footage videos and sometimes merged these presentations 
with interactive discussions.  
3. Information Dissemination 
It was difficult for the local media to overcome the erosion in public trust after the 
conflict.84Therefore, it was a necessity for UNMIL to start disseminating information by 
direct means such as UN radio broadcasts, posters, advertisements, and fliers. As the 
capacity-building activities continued, the PI section also began utilizing local media 
means.      
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The most effective needs were utilized in Liberia.  For example, although mass 
communication is very crucial in Liberia, it was found that the most effective way to 
communicate was through face-to-face communication, as Hunt asserted citing the 
former UNMIL chief military PIO.85 Formal media channels such as press releases and 
media conferences were able to reach the journalists in the local and international media 
but sometimes failed to reach a large portion of the targeted local population who were 
beyond the coverage of specific forms of media. Therefore, this context required creative 
and innovative methods for message dissemination and peace propaganda.86 
A culture steeped in the oral tradition is another peculiar feature in Liberia where 
people of rural areas share the media information with family, friends, and neighbors.   
Due to the lack of a comprehensive media, only through oral dissemination can the 
information find the way through these informal networks throughout the rural areas.87  
These channels also spread mistrust and manipulated information, thus jeopardizing the 
venerable peace processes. This makes the context more complicated in peacekeeping 
environments. However, in Liberia, the UNMIL PI section managed to utilize these 
channels in favor of peace and mission objectives. Friendly meetings with significant 
local groups increased the public support towards the mission. The peacekeepers also 
appreciated the importance of face-to-face communication in the local culture and 
utilized this in addressing the need for peace as well.  
In order to optimize PI activities, it is important for a mission to understand the 
causes of its success and failure. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that its PI is positively 
affecting the peace process and is perceived positively by the target audience, even 
though it is difficult in peacekeeping to measure the success of the PI. In post-conflict 
environments like Liberia, even the most basic indicators are not available, such as 
listener and readership figures. It is equally difficult to infer qualitative or quantitative 
results from behavioral change within the audience or a measurement of the intended 
outcome. When there is no feedback from the audience, the UN PI carries on its 
                                                 




activities, supposing that its strategies and tactics work and that the audience is receiving 
the message. Although the PI have some beneficial effects which yield quantitative 
inference through the mission activities, the numbers of ex-combatants disarmed during 
Demobilization Disarmament Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRR) campaigns, and 
the voter participation in presidential elections, it is still almost impossible to distinguish 
the PI effect from other independent variables. Therefore, UNMIL’s Media and External 
Relations Unit provided up to date information to the media, arranged meetings of the 
mission leaders with the media representatives within both the mission office blocks and 
media structures, and provided access to the media of the mission personnel in rural areas 
including transportation and security. 
As mentioned above, the Liberia mission was the first mission to have a PI 
section as an integrated part of the mission from the planning phase on. The PI personnel 
were sent to the mission area ahead of the mission and planned an optimum PI strategy 
after evaluating the social and media background of the country. They managed a very 
effective PI campaign from the first day of the mission and launched UNMIL Radio’s 
broadcast immediately. This media savvy approach made a revolutionary change in 
peacekeeping and in PI.88They changed the primary target of the PI campaigns from the 
international community and media to the local populations as well as the PI method 
from one-way information dissemination to two-way interactive communications. 
UNMIL’s radio broadcasting has been perhaps the most effective tool in PI in 
Liberia. As described earlier, given the high illiteracy and poverty rates, lack of access to 
other media types, and radio’s technical advantage for infrastructure and coverage, radio 
became the principal medium to disseminate information over a large geographical space 
in Liberia like most of the African countries.89  The radio broadcast started in the 
inception of the mission and surpassed the coverage of the local radios that were confined 
to FM. Beyond the dissemination of propaganda, radio also provided reliable and realistic 
information for the refugees and IDPs about the security situation and other conditions 
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back in their home regions and thus helped them decide when to return.90 This was a 
significant development in means of helping the activities of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The Publications and Print Unit used published posters, stickers, fliers, brochures, 
newsletters, and newspapers and helped local newspapers with editing and other activities 
in order to disseminate the mission’s communication to the local population. Although 
these activities seemed to be limited to literate people and some of the territories were not 
reachable because of non-UN friendly control by belligerent groups, the sharing culture, 
and reading out loud to those illiterate, the discussion of news among family, friends, and 
neighbors increased the coverage of information disseminated.91 These products were 
also important asa means of providing ostensible evidences of the existence of the 
mission as well as its activities. The unit also launched the UNMIL website in order the 
reach Internet users inside and out of Liberia. Furthermore, UNMIL produced region 
specific publications. 
UNMIL’s efforts were also supported by some NGOs. Search for Common 
Grounds, an international NGO ran a media campaign named Talking Drum Studio 
Liberia for local newspapers and radio stations. These programs included not only serious 
news and informational programs but also entertaining programs such as radio dramas, 
social discussion programs, and children’s programming.92 All of these programs aimed 
at reducing conflict and violence and increasing awareness towards reconciliation, peace, 
and democratization. 
4. Two-Way Information Dissemination 
The UNMIL Radio was able to address the demand in the market for information 
in an effective interactive way that the people of Liberia straightforwardly noticed as 
working. UNMIL Radio led the audience to call the live radio programs and enabled 
them to ask questions, make recommendations, and request songs. This enabled the locals 
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to have more fun, get more involved in UN activities, and it increased the communication 
between the peacekeepers and the local audience. Besides this direct feedback, the 
officers in the field also made surveys during the meetings and conversations with locals. 
All this direct and indirect feedback was collected, evaluated, and used in order to update 
and modify the broadcast strategies. This appropriation coupled with the integration of all 
mission proponents, provided a platform to various actors to disseminate their message. 
The radio used several local languages as well as official dialects to increase coverage 
and the rapport between broadcaster and audience.  
The UNMIL PI section has not only been the voice of the UN mission and other 
UN agencies but also has enabled these actors to better understand the local population as 
well as their perception of peace operations. The PI and most particularly UNMIL Radio 
have been delivering all of the messages for the whole UN community in line with the 
mission objectives, and they have helped the mission maintain currency, coherency, and 
credibility.93 The PI section also has been effective addressing the challenges of 
cooperation between UN civil, military, and police sections and has made sure none of 
these components deviate from the main path. The PI sections of military, police and civil 
sections of the mission managed to collaborate and overcome the adaptation of the 
military information sections from secrecy and opacity to transparency and information 
sharing.94The vertical administration lines and the lateral, mostly horizontal, lines of PI 
activities were arranged and also somehow integrated. Signals managed to reach almost 
all the rural populations and approximately ninety-five percent of the Liberian 
territory.95These signals somehow exceeded the territories in Liberia, and the UNMIL PI 
section maintained the UN’s key share as the main advertiser in the media.  
In order to reach the community levels that the transitional media could not reach 
effectively, the Community Outreach (CO) unit ran awareness-raising activities in 
theatres, music shows, concerts, dance shows, quiz competitions, high school 
competitions, as well as peace and reconciliation football tournaments which worked to 
                                                 




bring different groups, such as ex-combatants, together peacefully. The advertisement of 
these activities was done with posters, key rings, t-shirts, and text messages to mobile 
phones. In 2006, the Community Outreach Unit organized a mobile phone texting 
campaign in order to increase awareness of gender-based violence, and according to 
Hunt, it reached 500,000 people out of a population of three million Liberians.96 
The Media Monitoring Unit also kept an eye on the developments in the field and 
on the rapid development team in order to respond to the specific developments in 
particular regions. Wherever a kind of crime or conflict relapsed or other issues arose, the 
CO Unit was sent there to increase awareness about that particular problem.97 These 
activities of the CO unit put a human face to the activities of the PI, developed very good 
relationships with local groups and their leaders, and ultimately built a network of trust 
comprising of peacekeepers, NGOs, and civil society.98 This was very beneficial, 
particularly in the areas where the mission wanted the civil society to get involved in 
order to avoid being perceived as prescribing things from outside.  
The aforementioned informal networks that used the word-of-mouth 
communication in Liberian communities were utilized, and the information desired was 
rapidly disseminated throughout the targeted population. Also, these activities utilized the 
face-to-face communicating culture of Liberia. These interactions ultimately helped the 
civil society increase its bonds inside the informal lines and networks of the society. 
These communications with the civil society did not only involve two-way 
communication but also provided a real feedback from the forums of societal groups at 
the grass roots level. Overall these good relationships with the society contributed to the 
general mission’s success, putting the PI section in the frontline to steer the political 
process, which is the core of the mission.99 
Misunderstandings were avoided by the PI campaigns in sensitive areas such as 
presidential elections. For example, in order to project impartiality during the elections, 
                                                 





all football and text messaging activities were postponed because one of the candidates 
was a formal football player while the other one tried to come forward by using text 
messages. Use of these messages could be misunderstood or manipulated as if there was 
an affiliation with one of the candidates.100 The CO unit also helped the television and 
video unit to produce and deliver video programs for video clubs and stimulated 
discussion after these video shows. Some of the CO Officers watched Nigerian movies 
and football matches with local people and stimulated some discussions, finally driving 
the conversation toward the peace processes.101 
5. Resource Allocation 
The local media in post-conflict countries are generally dependent on external 
funds.  Since assistance from outsiders is generally motivated by political gains or self-
interests, they spoil the moral structure of the media. Most of the media workers in these 
countries are novices since a number of professional media members leave the country 
during the conflict, which increases the need for training. These problems compromise 
the integrity and credibility of media in the eyes of people.  
To overcome these kinds of shortcomings in Liberia, the UNMIL PI section 
always supported the local media. The PI section continued to be the biggest source of 
income for Liberian local media with six-month terms of contracts for advertising. In a 
time that is very critical for the media institutions to survive, this has been a temporary 
but vital solution for the struggling media in Liberia. 
In order to avoid misperceptions, UNMIL decided to give advertisements to the 
local media institutions with no discrimination against political orientation or level of 
professionalism, but this was criticized for providing help to wrong and undeserving 
parties. The UN assisted the Liberian government in their information campaigns that 
focused on investment in land development by providing jobs to former child soldiers, 
reconstruction, and aid assistance. For example, former child soldiers were trained while 
on the job in order to assist in building schools, farming, land cultivation, and carpentry. 
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E. THE ERITREA-ETHIOPIA CONFLICT 
The UN IODP campaign in Ethiopia suffered setbacks because the State hindered 
the UN’s operations including Information Operations campaigns. UN operations lasted 
from 2000 until 2008. The UN eventually had to pull out because the State made delivery 
of aid products almost impossible and endangered the lives of UN personnel.  Although 
UN operations in this country were moderately successful, it is still considered a failure 
in case studies of the implementation of good standards of the UN IODP. For example, 
the Ethiopian government accused the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) of 
“leaking stories” to the media, saying this could undermine confidence in the 
peacekeeping process. The Ethiopian government accused UNMEE of giving details of a 
serious confrontation between armed Ethiopian militia and Indian peacekeepers. UNMEE 
lodged an official protest after armed Ethiopian militia illegally entered the Temporary 
Security Zone (TSZ) and threatened peacekeepers:  
[An] Ethiopian foreign ministry statement said that details of the incidents 
earlier this month provided by UNMEE to journalists had been ‘distorted, 
selective half-truths’. ‘One would have thought that UNMEE, as the 
custodian of peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, for now would be 
discreet in its behavior and that it would, as much as possible, shun 
controversy with the parties, in public,’ the statement said. It said by 
‘cozying up’ to journalists, UNMEE had undermined its peacekeeping role 
and was acting like ‘politicians running for office.’102 
IODP were hindered in Ethiopia, but they were able to run some campaigns on 
State radio and television with State permission through outreach centers. These centers, 
which were established in 2002 as an official outlet for print, radio, and video materials 
about UNMEE and the United Nations, helped to keep local populations informed of 
UNMEE’s work to facilitate peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Outreach Centers in 
Asmara and Barentu, Eritrea, were closed in 2003, at the request of the government. 
Additionally, the State of Eritrea hindered all aspects of the UN IODP.103 
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The peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia (UNMEE) was a UN mission operated to 
solve the issues between the two nations after two years of fighting in a border dispute. 
The mission was mandated to maintain a liaison with the parties and establish a 
mechanism for verifying the ceasefire. During the operation, the peacekeepers maintained 
commonplace IODP activities to support peacekeeping operations. However, in July 30, 
2008, the mission was terminated by the Security Council as a response to “crippling 
limitations” levied by the Eritrean Government.104 The Public Information section was a 
main component of the mission besides political, military, mine action, and 
administrative components, and included an apparatus for harmonization with the 
humanitarian community.105 The Eritrean government effectively stymied UNMEE from 
broadcasting over the airwaves for a period of approximately six months. Radio programs 
were made available on the UNMEE website, but these were accessible to only a very 
small minority of the Eritrean public. Additional problems regarding government 
screening of the UN-produced magazine, too, arose with Eritrea in 2004, causing 
magazine publication to cease for a number of months until the situation was resolved 
through negotiations.106 
1. Hierarchy of Needs 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world with its per capita income of 
only $110 per year.  Agriculture accounts for half of the country’s GDP, accounting for 
ninety percent of all exports and eighty percent of total employment. The agriculture 
sector often suffers from drought and poor cultivation practices leaving over five million 
people in need of food assistance each year. Given the low life-expectancy rates and 
literacy rates, the lower costs of broadcast and infrastructure, radio makes it the most 
significant tool for IODP in Ethiopia. Therefore, the UN should have aimed for radio 
programs wherever the local government allows and should run local radio stations in 
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different local languages. Wind-up radios should have been delivered to the people in 
rural areas who may have difficulty in acquiring electricity or buying batteries. Printed 
media tools such as posters and newspapers would also have worked to reach the literate 
people of Ethiopia. The potential of the Ethiopian society could have improved 
educational programs that increased growth literacy rates and the delivery of media tools 
such as radios so that media outreach can be enlarged.  As was done with the video clubs 
in Liberia, any opportunity to engage with the social texture should have been utilized.  
2. Operational Environment 
The Ethiopian State owns and strictly controls the primary media of television and 
radio. Not only is there no independent TV and radio in Ethiopia, but access to 
information is also tightly controlled. At a United Nation's peacekeeping mission in 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Addis Ababa in the summer of 2001, Joseph Legwaila, Special 
Representative to Secretary General of the UN (SRSG), said he feels “sorry for the 
repression of journalists in Eritrea and Ethiopia, but protecting free press is not part of the 
mission's mandate.”107The focus in the Information Operations campaign in Ethiopia was 
centered on increasing operational effectiveness against internal and external threats, 
influencing public opinion to support United Nations peacekeeping activities, and 
ensuring the stability during crises. However, the Public Information campaign was slow 
moving and plagued with problems with the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments.  In 
Ethiopia, the media had been deeply polarized, reflecting some divisions of trust in UN 
Information Operation Campaigns.  The UNIODP was difficult in Ethiopia because the 
government had such a tight control over the media. The governments of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea run, monitor, and regulate every aspect of the media. UNIODP relied heavily on 
private local media outlets, Western media, and word of mouth to convey their messages.  
Throughout the war, “reporters on both sides peddled hate propaganda and serious 
insults in newspapers, radio, and television, calling each other puppets of their respective 
governments,” says Nita Bhalla, the BBC correspondent in Ethiopia's capital, Addis 
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Ababa. He notes that private newspapers won respect by sending reporters out to the 
front lines to bring back stories that “were supportive of the war effort.”108  For the two 
rival governments, the press was a vital tool in garnering support during the border 
dispute. 
3. Two-Way Communication 
Considering the conditions under which the UN IODP conducts their tasks in 
contemporary peacekeeping missions, it must be admitted that communication is much 
more challenging than it is under standard circumstances. The UN IODP must conduct 
their Information Operations campaigns with the effort to target various organizations 
and individuals who belong to different cultural backgrounds and such conditions 
demand specialized communication tools that enforce two-way communications. 
However, in these countries and particularly in Eritrea, UNMEE was not able to bring 
these tools into being due to the hindrance from local governments.  
The UNIODP established a precedent that Information Operations campaigns 
were to be structured around issues of development and aid, rather than political 
questions such as the constitution or land borders. For example, the Public Information 
Office established Outreach Centers in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2002 to inform local 
populations about UNMEE’s role in the peace process.  The Outreach Centers in Ethiopia 
were based in Addis Ababa, Mekelle, and Adigrat.  Outreach Centers in Eritrea were 
established in Asmara and Barentu but were closed in 2003 at the request of the 
government. By September 2005, the three Outreach Centers in Ethiopia had welcomed 
150,000 visitors. Between July, 2006, and June, 2007, more than 40,000 people visited 
the centers. 
Outreach Center staff visited schools, universities, and local organizations to 
answer questions about UNMEE and distribute copies of the bi-monthly UNMEE news 
magazine and other UN publications. Staffs at the Mekelle and Adigrat Outreach Centers 
continue to provide information services for the northern Tigray region, traveling 
                                                 
108Sorokobi Yves Committee to Protect Journalists [Online] // cpj.org. - Committee to Protect 
Journalists, July 2, 2003. - May 11, 2012. - http://www.cpj.org/reports/2003/07/war-words.php. 
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hundreds of miles to distribute magazines and screen videos from a mobile van.109 The 
centers distribute print, radio, and video materials about UNMEE and the United Nations. 
They also have computers with internet access that students can use to research 
peacekeeping and other UN-related school and university assignments.  
4. One-Way Communication 
Because positive media coverage can significantly support the UN IODP, media 
constitutes an important element of the IODP information campaigns. Communication 
with the media and the way they report about UN IODP operations considerably 
influences host nations. Using resources like TV, newspapers, and radio allows the local 
population knowledge about the positive things happening with UN peacekeeping in their 
country and what the mandate and the main objectives of the UNMEE are. Local 
interaction with the population through meetings with local authorities, tribal leaders and 
individuals, and quick-impact, country-development projects conducted by UNMEE 
usually attracted media attention. On such occasions, it was able to dramatically improve 
the image of the UN IODP, thus contributed to major improvements in the whole 
peacekeeping effort. 
In Ethiopia, the UN IODP’s overall strategy for managing information flow was 
to control the message from the center of gravity to the periphery. Because government 
regulations were difficult to penetrate, and there was no UN mandate that included free 
speech for the press, the UN IODP had to adopt different approaches to disseminate their 
message. Word of mouth, for example, became a major tool for centralizing UN 
Information Operation campaigns and ensuring that the local populations received the 
message. This communication, though employing an interactive mechanism, was largely 
one‐way. The UN IODP disseminated messages through local officials who were 
“trained” in Information Operations. Overall, the UN IODP information strategy targeted 
the poor. This received a greater push in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. There are 
parallels; for example, the UN IODP focused on rural communities, as they were more 
receptive to receiving messages based on economic development as compared to party 
                                                 
109“Public Outreach “ http://unmee.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=82 (accessed 5/28/2012). 
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ideals. These people are then organized into small groups that receive training and serve 
as a source of information, but most importantly, as conduits for developmental 
messages. 
UNMEE radio first broadcasted from Eritrea in January 2001 with a one hour 
program twice a week. Eritrea suspended broadcasts in October 2001, and permitted 
resumption of the one-hour shows in June 2002. Ethiopia did not cede control of its 
airwaves, and refused to give UNMEE free airtime. To help circumvent these local 
difficulties, UNMEE began shortwave broadcasts from the United Arab Emirates, with 
one-hour shows on Tuesdays and Fridays. Considerably reducing the effective length of 
its shows, UNMEE divided each hour into English and anywhere between three to five 
local languages.110 
5. Information Dissemination 
The dissemination of information products through various mediums—television, 
Internet, radio, face-to-face contact—in order to influence decision making, still poses 
challenges to the United Nations PI in countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia.  The channels 
mentioned of course make it easier to ensure the information is delivered to the 
population; however, with so much information being delivered to the public, it can be 
hard for them to decide what is truly time-sensitive as compared to what is trivial and 
unimportant.  Face-to-face interaction with the population will always be the most 
effective means of influence.  The focus of the UN IODP must be on the center of gravity 
in any conflict: the country’s people and their belief in and support of the UN’s Public 
Information campaign.  Winning their hearts and minds must be the objective of the UN 
IODP efforts. Information that appears as propaganda or PSYOPs, may not only be 
rejected but can also be counterproductive to an ongoing Public Information Campaign. 
Under new Information Age conditions, an information campaign that involves the IODP 
must take appropriate actions to influence the population to assume a positive, 
participative, and supportive attitude towards UN peacekeeping operations.  
                                                 
110Lindley, Untapped Power? The Status of UN Information Operations16. 
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In this context, Information Operations campaigns represent useful techniques 
through which the UN IODP can attain their PI objectives.  For programming and 
implementations, innovative and creative adaptations of popular cultures can be used 
almost as a form of entertainment. As Hunt states, entertainment programs, street 
theaters, leaflets, brochures, competitions, or posters can be more effective to give out the 
message indirectly in the form of an entertainment program as opposed to direct 
indoctrination.111 Additionally, he believes the message can be better understood if it is 
represented through someone or something that is championed and easily identifiable to 
the local population.  Given the low literacy rates of some host countries, there is even 
more need for this indirect approach, particularly in African countries such as Ethiopia 
and Eritrea. Today, Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders say they are working hard on new 
press laws that would curb foreign or “terrorist” funding of the local press. 
                                                 
111Hunt, Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, 10. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In the years ahead, United Nations Information Operations during Peacekeeping 
(IODP) will become an area of increasing importance, and possible strategic challenges. 
The net result of a changing peace operations combined with the enduring interests of the 
United Nations will result in a notable growth in UN IODP.  However, the UN on its own 
may not be sufficient. They need to involve other organizations, NGOs, and possibly 
military support to accomplish their mission. For example, their work in Kosovo should 
be used as an example on how to accomplish and achieve a successful UN IO mission. 
This worked because they were operating in a region where their mission was primarily 
understood. They should utilize elements from this mission and try to apply it to areas 
where the UN mission is not clearly defined. 
An examination of the current UN IODP must not just examine lessons learned, 
and professional opinions: it must consider how IODP challenges with the population in 
current peacekeeping operations necessitate adjustments and adaptations. The UN IODP 
was successful in Kosovo and mildly successful in Liberia because the UN IODP was 
able to tie their approach and message of change and improvement to the local 
populations’ everyday lives. If a person is persuaded to go along with another’s purposes 
without any explicit threat or exchange taking place, influence is at work; this is how the 
UNIODP was able to maintain success in Kosovo and Liberia and become a leading force 
among NGOs and other outreach organizations in the areas where they were involved.  
Moreover, the most important element in the UN IODP’s success in Kosovo and 
Liberia was its support from the population. Information Operations are thus a critical 
aspect of any peace operations. The media reach not only the homes of citizens, but also 
their minds. The ability to control the message being presented may result in the ability to 
influence the thoughts but possibly even the behavior of the recipient of the message. 
UN peacekeeping operations are not likely to succeed without gaining the support 
of the host nations and Information Operations are essential for this support.  Although 
the UN does not acknowledge that it uses IO to affect the host populations, our case 
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studies show that the media and communication tools are used by the UN with an aim of 
social change in host nations towards peace and development goals. Case studies also 
show that the effectiveness of this Information Operations (IODP) can be increased by an 
interactive, communicative, informing, and entertaining approach. With this approach, 
direct and indirect feedback from the audience is attained through call-ins, emails, text 
messages and face-to-face friendly meetings. This feedback is then evaluated with care 
and used for increasing the effectiveness through corrections and updates. Although news 
and awareness programs are the frontline of the IODP, sometimes these operations need 
to go beyond these serious tasks.  
The entertaining features of the media should also be used in IODP such as talk 
shows, cartoons, TV and radio dramas, comedy shows, quiz shows, soap operas, comic 
books, theatre presentations and even songs. As a result, the PI should not be confined to 
the direct methods of news and information dissemination, but on the contrary include the 
beneficial indirect methods of the above-mentioned media tools.112 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are a lot of complications in the post-
conflict countries lowering the trust of the people towards local media. As Hunt stated, 
most journalists in these countries are beginners since many of the previous journalists 
were killed or displaced during the conflict.113 Generally, the local government and 
internal mechanisms of the media are incapable and/or unenthusiastic about increasing 
the capacity of the media. Therefore capacity-building activities such as training of media 
members, advertisement giving and editing assistance should also be provided for the 
local media.  
The UN’s mission should cause no harm to the local media. Although it is a 
requirement to hire some local media members in the PI section, and in the UN media 
outlets, the local media force should not be undermined. For example, all of the famous 
reporters and editors should not be hired. Likewise the footprint of the IODP should be 
balanced and a soft exit strategy must be planned in advance. In some instances media 
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outlets like UNMIL radio become very prominent for the local population and when the 
mission is aborted, it may cause a feeling of deprivation.  A substitute for this kind of 
media outlet should be created and supported in the local media and time must be 
allowed for people to get adapted. Likewise all the directorial and field tasks should not 
be assumed by internationals. Trained local members should be given roles and prepare 
for maintaining these tasks after the end of mission.  
There is still a need for the HQ-level leaders to further appreciate the importance 
of the PI.114  In order to solve this problem, the leaders of the HQ should take the 
feedback from the field into account both from the local population and mission 
members. Cultural awareness and sensitivity, and understanding the background in which 
they operate are very important. Even in the initial phase of the mission the case specific 
features must be evaluated and be taken into account. They should be updated throughout 
the operation with the help of the daily information and feedback from the media 
audience.  
During interactions with local media, the PI officers should not expect a quick 
stride. It should always be kept in mind that development of a free and honest media in 
emerging democracies requires time. The local media should be supported with training 
on professional norms, even small accomplishments on Universal media norms and ethics 
should be encouraged and rewarded.  
Information sharing and collaboration problems should be solved within the 
humanitarian community and there must be strong links between PI sections and 
executive mechanisms of the mission.  Since the PI section makes the advertisement of 
the active sections, it needs to be aware of the challenges active sections face and the 
requirements of those duties, and vice versa. In order to enable harmony and information 
sharing within the mission, IODP must be in the UN mission mandate. Otherwise it will 
be unlikely to be addressed as a coherent, unified program by the leaders on the ground.  
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